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Abstract  
This thesis consists of two chapters and aims to investigate the presence Islamic banks 
in Indonesia in the context of stability and monetary policy transmission mechanism. The 
first chapter compares bank stability, in particular profit stability, in Islamic versus 
conventional banks amid business cycle fluctuations. The unique characteristics of Islamic 
finance principles hypothetically involve different financial structures and provide stability 
for banks that comply with them. Using monthly bank-level data with comparable banks 
across the two types, I investigate the dynamic responses of individual banks to business 
cycle fluctuations. The dynamic estimation results show that the profits of Islamic banks’ are 
more stable than those of conventional banks in the short run, yet generally indicate no 
significant difference in the long run. However, the inclusion of the loan-to-asset ratio 
removes the remaining short-run differences. I check for robustness by estimating the static 
relationship between individual bank’s profits and the average profitability of the total 
banking industry, and the outcomes support the no-difference results. The second chapter 
compares the monetary transmission through Islamic and conventional banks by 
investigating how a particular bank asset portfolio, which corresponds to their type from 
being conventional or Islamic, determines the equilibrium rate of return on loans and on 
deposits which in turn affects their loans and net-borrowing from the central bank. Certain 
application of Islamic finance principles leads to a marked difference in Islamic banks’ 
assets portfolio which corresponds to a consistently higher loan-to-asset ratio in comparison 
to conventional banks. I test a set of predictions conveyed by the theoretical model using a 
panel of individual bank data. The results turn to be highly dependent on how well the two 
types of banks are segregated from each other, in which slack segregation may dissipate the 
potential differences. In particular while initially the results show no significant difference in 
responses of the two types of banks to the central bank policy rate, excluding Islamic 
windows from the sample allow the potentially difference to be more apparent and 
significant. Overall, the possibility that both types of banks may after the same pool of 
consumers exposes them to compete with banks from the other type, generating arbitrage 
opportunities that drive prices toward equality across types and impede the potential 
difference across banks. 
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Introduction  
This thesis aims to investigate the presence of Islamic banks in a country that has a 
dual banking system, i.e. a system where conventional and Islamic banks operate side by 
side within the economy, in the context of stability and the monetary policy transmission 
mechanism. 
Islamic banks are banks that comply with the prescription in Sharia law concerning its 
operation, which is based on the Quran and the Hadith – the authentic tradition. The general 
principles of Islamic finance could be summarized, but not limited, to the following: 
prohibition of interest, thus encouraging the profit and loss sharing mechanism; prohibition 
of contractual uncertainty; and prohibition of gambling, speculation or excessive risk-taking 
in carrying out transactions (Askari et al., 2010). Islamic principles also promote a 
“materiality” aspect, requiring the direct linking of financing with the underlying asset so 
that any “financing activity is clearly and closely identified with the real economy” (Iqbal 
and Mirakhor, 2007). In its operations, according to Askari et al. (2010), the concept of 
Islamic banking includes two types of banking activities: (i) safe keeping and payment 
activities and (ii) equity-based investment activities. The first is basically 100% reserve 
banking, where deposits remain highly liquid and where checking services are perfectly 
available. In the second, the depositor is, in essence, purchasing equity in the bank, and the 
bank itself has an equity position in the borrower’s business in which Islamic banks directly 
participate in a risk-taking process through trade, leasing and other productive investments 
in the real sectors. 
In a more general context, the concept of Islamic banking activities resembles 
proposals for monetary reform known as the Chicago Plan, initiated in Simons (1933, 1948) 
and revived in Benes and Kumhof (2012); and, more recently, the Limited Purpose Banking 
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(LPB) proposed in Kotlikoff (2011) and Chamley et al. (2012). Both proposals emphasise 
the necessity of 100% reserve requirement and the importance of eliminating leverage from 
the financial intermediaries in achieving a stable and well-functioning financial system.
1
 
While those two proposals are not yet implemented, many countries have partially adopted 
the Islamic banking concept within their dual banking system. Nevertheless, the concept of 
Sharia-compliant product and services of Islamic banking varies a great deal across 
countries (Beck et al., 2013). Many also argue that Islamic banks’ day-to-day operations are 
diverging from the initial concept above, diminishing the gap between Islamic and 
conventional banks (see among others:  Chong and Liu (2009); and Cevik and Charap 
(2011)). 
This thesis examines Islamic banking practices in the context of stability and the 
monetary policy transmission mechanism in the case of Indonesia in two chapters. While the 
first chapter directly assesses stability in terms of profit stability, the second chapter does 
this by evaluating banks’ responsiveness to monetary policy.  
The first chapter focuses on profit stability of Islamic and conventional banks by 
measuring the sensitivity of bank profits to fluctuations in the business cycle using dynamic 
panel estimation of Blundell and Bond (1998). Based on the above concept, Islamic banks’ 
profitability is more stable than conventional banks, since Islamic banks have the ability to 
adjust their liability in accordance with their assets performance. The results show that 
Islamic banks have slightly better, yet statistically significant, stability in the short-run in 
comparison to conventional banks. Nevertheless, this difference is not large enough to 
deliver any difference in profits variability across the two types of banks in general.   
The second chapter provides theoretical and empirical studies on how the specific 
transmission mechanism of monetary policy works in Islamic and conventional banks within 
a dual banking system. In particular, how a certain bank characteristic, which corresponds to 
their type as either conventional or Islamic, determines the equilibrium rate of return on 
loans and on deposits, which, in turn, affects their loans and net-borrowing from the central 
                                                          
1
 LPB is actually a proposal that designated to reform not just the banking system but also all 
financial intermediaries such as insurances, hedge funds, etc. (Kotlikoff, 2011).  
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bank in response to the policy rate. This characteristic is the loan-to-assets ratio, which, due 
to the “materiality” aspect of Islamic finance explained above and the limited sharia-
compliant financial products that are available in the market, is consistently higher in 
Islamic banks in comparison to conventional banks. The empirical work tests a set of 
predictions using difference-in-difference method and initially finds that there is no-
difference in responses of the two types of banks to the central bank policy rate. However, 
when Islamic windows are excluded from the sample, the results show significant 
differences in the response of rate of return on loans and net-borrowing from the central 
bank in response to the policy rate.
2
 In particular, in support for the theoretical framework, 
monetary policy that works via conventional banks is stronger than Islamic banks. 
Overall, these studies show that the dual banking system may inevitably drives both 
types of banks to somewhat share their customer base, generating arbitrage opportunities 
that may drive prices toward equality across types. This is particularly stronger for Islamic 
windows where the two types of banks are closely inter-correlated to each other. While 
empirical results of the second chapter show that Islamic full-fledged may relatively have 
more limited exposure to conventional banks, it does not necessarily imply that they are not 
in competition with conventional banks. This is reflected in the first chapter, that only deals 
with Islamic full-fledge banks, which suggests that there is a possibility that some Islamic 
banks may partly depart from the initial concept of an equity-based system by smoothing out 
the payment to their depositors in order to sustain their competitiveness with conventional 
banks. Nevertheless, future research is needed to further investigate this income smoothing 
possibilities. Further, the empirical results in the second chapter confirm the similar 
evolution of rate of return on deposits across the two types of banks, which may also 
indicate that the two types of banks are in competition with each other. As one of the 
consequences, though Islamic banks tend to be more stable in term of their responsiveness to 
monetary policy, yet they generally could not provide better stability in term of their 
profitability in comparison to their conventional counterpart. 
                                                          
2
 Islamic window are units of conventional banks that offer Islamic banking services. 
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Chapter 1 Bank Profitability and Business Cycles: 
Are Islamic Banks more Stable? 
Evidence from Indonesia  
 
 
 
 
1.1 Introduction 
Macro-prudential analyses require thorough knowledge of how banking sector 
profitability is related to business cycles (Albertazzi and Gambacorta, 2009); this is 
especially true for a bank-based economy. The banking sector’s soundness and stability are 
closely determined by its profitability and the structural factors affecting it (Demirguc-Kunt 
& Detragiache, 1998). In particular, bank balance sheets can deteriorate when the rate of 
return on the asset side, which is closely related to overall business performance through the 
economic performance of bank borrowers, falls short of the rate that must be paid on the 
liability side. Hence, from this point of view, if banks could adjust their liability according to 
their assets performance, hypothetically the system would be inherently stable and less 
sensitive to business cycle fluctuations.  
Theoretical studies in Islamic banking, such as those of Khan and Mirakhor (1987, 
1991) and Askari et al. (2010), assert such flexibility.
3
 In theory, there are several marked 
differences in Islamic finance compared to conventional finance. What follows are the basic 
                                                          
3 The theoretical Islamic banking is not the only concept who offers flexible as opposed to fixed predetermined 
return in banking products. Simons (1948) with his proposal the Chicago Plan, revived recently by Benes and 
Kumhof (2012); and most recently the Limited Purpose Banking in Kotlikoff (2011) and Chamley et al. (2012) 
are among the proponent of equity-based banking system.  
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principles of Islamic finance, according to Iqbal and Mirakhor (2007). First, Islamic finance 
principles prohibit interest-based payments. Any predetermined rate tied to the maturity and 
the principal amount, so that it is guaranteed regardless of the performance of the 
investment, is prohibited. Second, Islamic law encourages profit making, for it represents 
successful entrepreneurship and the creation of additional wealth. Islamic finance requires 
borrowers and lenders to share rewards and losses in an equitable fashion, and this process 
of accumulating and distributing wealth in the economy represents true productivity. Third, 
Islamic finance principles promote a “materiality” aspect that requires financing to be 
associated directly with the underlying asset, in which “the financing activity is clearly and 
closely identified with the real sector activity”. Lastly, hoarding is discouraged and 
transactions featuring extreme uncertainty or gambling with excessive risks and the 
financing of specific illicit activities are prohibited. With reference to stability, Khan and 
Mirakhor (1987) and Askari et al. (2010) emphasise the usage of the profit and loss sharing 
mechanism on both sides of the bank balance sheets, especially with respect to the liability 
side, as a device to ensure banks’ financial stability in general or profit stability in particular, 
albeit departing from any potential problems of moral hazard. 
In practice, however, many argue that, nowadays, Islamic banks’ day-to-day 
operations are diverging from these initial principles, albeit implicitly. Some of the emerging 
financial products of the Islamic banking industry closely resemble products of conventional 
banking, diminishing the gap between the two systems. Empirical studies by Chong and Liu 
(2009) and Cevik and Charap (2011), among others, on Malaysian Islamic banks find that 
Islamic deposit – or equivalent – rates are not interest-free, but closely pegged to 
conventional deposit rates.  On the asset side, Khan (2010) finds that, for a sample of large 
Islamic banks across several countries, only a negligible portion of Islamic banks’ financing 
is actually based on a profit and loss sharing mechanism. These sorts of findings may 
indicate an impediment to the inherent stability that theory predicts. Whether there are 
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differences in profit stability across business cycle fluctuations between Islamic and non-
Islamic banks is an empirical question.
4
  
In a small but growing literature on Islamic banking, some studies have already 
sought to analyse the financial stability, in particular insolvency risk, of Islamic banks and 
tease out any differences in comparison to its conventional counterparts.
5
 Cihak and Hesse 
(2010), Beck et al. (2013), and Abedifar et al. (2013) use cross-countries’ bank-level data of 
OIC members to assess and compare the financial stability of Islamic banks versus non-
Islamic banks. While Cihak and Hesse focuses its work solely on assessing insolvency risk, 
Beck et al. and Abedifar et al. do this as a part of another research focus, such as efficiency 
and business models for the second study, and credit risk, interest rate risk and religious rent 
for the third study. All these three studies employ the z-score as a measure of bank stability 
or insolvency risk.
6
  In general, they find that, controlling each country’s characteristics, 
there is no significant difference in terms of stability between Islamic and non-Islamic 
banks. If the analysis takes into account bank size, Cihak and Hesse (2010) finds that small 
Islamic banks tend to be more stable than their conventional counterparts, while the contrary 
applies for large Islamic banks. Similar results are also found by Abedifar et al. (2013) for 
small banks, but they do not discover any difference for large banks. As for Beck et al. 
(2013), they do not encounter any significant difference in stability across all specifications. 
In this paper, we follow Albertazzi and Gambacorta (2009) in using one of the 
components of the z-score, namely profitability, as the dependent variable in measuring 
bank stability in facing fluctuations of the business cycle. There are other factors which can 
serve as financial stability indicator such as for example liquidity and loan quality. However, 
we focus on profitability because it is one of the main indicators of financial soundness in 
banking (see Financial Soundness Indicator, IMF (2006)) and some studies find that bank 
                                                          
4 I use the term non-Islamic and conventional banks interchangeably; however the empirical sections merely use 
the term non-Islamic banks.  
5 Abedifar et al. (2013) provides a summary of empirical literature on Islamic banking. 
6 The z-score, theoretically developed by Boyd and Runkle (1993), measures the probability or distance to 
default, combining profitability, leverage and volatility. Higher value of z-score implies a lower probability of 
insolvency. It has been used quiet extensively in the recent literature; see e.g. Laeven and Levine (2005), 
Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (2010) and Houston et al. (2010).   
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profitability is an important predictor of banking sector vulnerability (Demirguc-Kunt and 
Detragiache (1999), Cihak and Schaeck (2007) and Navajas and Thegeya (2013)).  Adverse 
economic condition leads to deterioration of loans quality, increasing non-performing loans 
and credit losses, which ultimately worsen banks’ profits. We further compare the stability 
of Islamic versus non-Islamic banks by measuring the sensitivity of bank profits to the 
business cycle. The more sensitive bank profits are to business cycle fluctuations, the more 
likely it is for profitability to be unstable. This mode of analysis stems from the prediction 
that banks’ ability to adjust their liability in accordance with their assets performance 
(through profit and loss sharing mechanism in the case of Islamic banks) influences the 
stability of their profits. Based on this, as suggested by Khan and Mirakhor (1987) and 
Askari et al. (2010), Islamic banks’ profitability is more stable than non-Islamic banks. The 
resulting empirical framework allows prediction of factors affecting bank profitability, as 
well as comparison of sensitivity to the business cycle across the two bank groups. By so 
doing, the empirical framework also partially serves as a test for the implementation of profit 
and loss sharing mechanism of Indonesian Islamic banks. 
There are quite a range of studies in modelling bank profitability (for cross countries 
studies, see Bourke, 1989; Molyneux and Thornton, 1992; and, more recently, Goddard et 
al., 2011; Athanasoglou et al., 2008, for the Greek case; Dietrich and Wanzenried, 2011, for 
the Switzerland case), whereas only a dearth of studies exist on Islamic banks; to name a 
very view is Bashir and Hassan (2003) for a cross-countries analysis. Most of these studies 
use macroeconomic and business cycle variables as control variables. There are also studies 
that explicitly investigate the relationship between bank profitability and the business cycle: 
Bikker and Hu (2002), and, more recently, Albertazzi and Gambacorta (2009) empirically 
assess the cyclicality of bank profitability by investigating the way components of bank 
profitability relate to the business cycle.  
This paper attempts to compare the fluctuations – or stability – of Islamic and 
conventional banks’ profitability by investigating its sensitivity to the business cycle 
fluctuations. To our knowledge, it is the first paper to provide such a comparison from this 
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angle. The novelty of this paper lies in its ability to simultaneously model Islamic and 
conventional banks’ profitability, as well as comparing its stability amid fluctuations in the 
business cycle. We utilize Indonesian bank-level data for monthly periods during 2007:1-
2012:10. To investigate the dynamic response of individual bank profitability to business 
cycle fluctuations, we employ a dynamic panel technique which allows estimation on short-
run and long-run responses simultaneously. We check for robustness by running the same 
regression on two sample sets, one includes all banks and the other only includes banks with 
comparable in terms of their ownership structure and assets size across types, Islamic and 
conventional. The dynamic results show that the profitability of Islamic banks is more stable 
than conventional banks in the short-run and this result is robust across sample sets. Though 
the short-run difference in profit stability between Islamic and conventional banks is 
statistically significant, yet the magnitude is fairly small. The inclusions of bank-specific 
characteristics, such as size, credit risks and capital, do not alter the results. However, the 
inclusion of the loan-to-asset ratio removes the remaining short-run differences. As there is 
evidence that a bank with a higher value of this particular characteristic has more stable 
profitability, which Islamic banks inherently possess, this implies that the loan-to-asset ratio 
may well explain the perceived short-run difference between the two groups. These dynamic 
results are even stronger for the sample set of banks with similar ownership structure and 
assets size.  For the final robustness check and to grasp an overview on fluctuations of 
profitability across the two banking groups, we estimate the static relationship between 
individual bank profitability and the average profitability of the total banking industry. We 
find no evidence of differing fluctuations between the two bank groups across sample sets, 
which supports the no-difference results of the first stage’s long-run estimations. Thus, in 
general, we could not observe significant difference in fluctuations of Islamic and non-
Islamic banks profitability. 
The paper is organized in the following manner. Section 2 briefly describes 
Indonesian dual banking industry. Section 3 explains the methodology and outlines the data. 
Section 4 presents the empirical results. Section 5 concludes the paper. 
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1.2 A Brief Overview of the Indonesian Dual Banking Industry  
This section firstly outlines overall performance, details some facts about the 
Indonesian banking sector, and then briefly describes the development of the country’s 
Islamic banking industry. 
The banking industry dominates the entire financial sector of Indonesia, whose assets 
account for 80% of the sector’s total assets. Nevertheless, the financial sector assets account 
for around only 85% of total GDP, which reflect relatively shallow financial sector 
inclusions. In terms of contribution to the economy, the total loans of the industry only 
account for around 35% of GDP, while internal funds remain the main source of funds for 
firms’ investment activities. This low contribution is due to relatively underdeveloped and 
shallow financial markets in Indonesia. In regard to the recent widespread financial crisis of 
2008, though the impact to Indonesia was fairly limited, the banking sector endured a swift 
period of liquidity shortage in August, when the ratio of liquid instruments held by banks to 
non-core deposits reached its lowest point of around 85%,
7
 and the financial stability index 
(FSI) reached its highest point in November of 2.43.
8
 In spite of this, the total bank loans by 
that time were still growing quite high for annual growth more than 30%. In terms of the 
structure of the industry, the banking sector is dominated by government-owned banks, in 
which five of the top banks account for around 45% of market share. Following deregulation 
in 1998, triggered by the banking crisis, foreign ownership increased dramatically for up to 
30% changes in total market share. 
The Indonesian banking sector adopts a dual system, in which conventional and 
Islamic banks operate side by side within the economy. The first Islamic bank was 
established in 1992. In order to encourage the development and network expansion of the 
Islamic banking industry, the government amended the Banking Act in 1998, which allowed 
conventional banks to open an Islamic window, a unit that provides Islamic banking 
services. It further strengthened the business by amending the Central Bank Act in 1999, 
                                                          
7 Basically, a ratio less than 100% indicates that a bank does not have adequate liquidity to meet deposit 
withdrawals. 
8 The FSI in Indonesia represents financial sector stability, which includes banking, bonds and stock markets. 
The maximum indicative limit is level of 2.00. In the economic crisis of 1997/98, the index topped at 3.23.   
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allowing monetary control using instruments that are based on Islamic principles. To further 
boost the industry, a dedicated act for Islamic banking was issued in 2008, in which the 
existence of Islamic windows is regarded as temporary, and shall be completely spun-off to 
fully-fledged Islamic banks by adding more capital up to a certain level. In addition, besides 
establishing new Islamic banks, one can convert a conventional bank into an Islamic bank, 
but not the other way around. During the sample period of this paper, there are cases of such 
conversions, which are commonly carried out by the acquisition of smaller banks by 
conventional banks then converted into Islamic banks.  
The inclination of people to employ Islamic banking services is stimulated by the 
issuance of a verdict on the prohibition of interest by the council of the country’s Islamic 
scholars in 2003.  Nonetheless, though the Indonesian population is predominantly Muslim, 
the Islamic banking sector still accounts for just a very small portion of the banking industry, 
with total assets accounting for around 5% of the total industry’s assets, though there is rapid 
annual growth of more than 50%-60% on average. One of the conditions that commonly 
cited as an explanation for low market share is the dearth of product innovation in the 
Islamic bank portfolio. Compliance with Sharia, or Islamic, principles may hinder financial 
product innovation and, in turn, hamper Islamic bank competitiveness. In addition, there are 
differences in the interpretation of Sharia across Muslim countries.  
 
1.3 Methodology and Data 
1.3.1 Methodology 
To compare Islamic and non-Islamic banks’ profits sensitivity with the business cycle 
fluctuations, the following empirical model is applied to a panel of individual Islamic and 
non-Islamic banks in Indonesia:  
 
ijtijtjtijtjijt XNIZXNIc     , ijtiijt u  (1.1) 
where ijt  is the profitability of bank i  from group j , i.e. Islamic or non-Islamic, at 
time t , c is a constant term, jNI  is a non-Islamic dummy which is equal to 1 for non-
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Islamic banks and 0 for Islamic banks, ijtX  is a matrix of bank characteristics as control 
variables, tZ is the business cycle variable and ijt  the disturbance, with i the unobserved 
bank-specific effect and ijtu the idiosyncratic error. Equation (1) is a one-way error 
component regression model, where i ∼IIN  2,0 a  and independent of ijtu , which may 
have bank-specific patterns of heteroskedasticity and serial correlation that are uncorrelated 
across banks.  
The effect of business cycles on profitability is captured by the sum of parameters   
and   for Islamic banks and by the sum of parameters  ,   and   for non-Islamic banks. 
In general, we expect procyclicality in bank profitability. The interaction terms of the 
components in the bracket with the business cycle variable are intended to capture how 
banks from the two groups, Islamic and non-Islamic, and with different characteristics, may 
respond differently to business cycle fluctuations. In particular, the interaction with jNI  is 
the main variable of interest in which any difference between variability and or stability in 
profitability of the two groups is captured by parameter . The interpretation of which group 
is the one with more stable profitability depends on the sign and magnitude of these 
estimated parameters. Non-Islamic banks would have more unstable profits if both 
parameters have the same sign, or if the absolute sum of the two is greater than the absolute 
value of  .9 The straightforward intuition is that profitability of a bank with a larger 
response to the business cycles is more volatile than a bank with a smaller response. 
According to the theoretical analysis of Khan and Mirakhor (1987) and Askari et al. 
(2010), a non-Islamic bank is expected to be more unstable in comparison to its Islamic 
counterpart based on a condition that the latter treats deposits similarly with shares or equity, 
in which depositors would not be guaranteed a predetermined nominal return; they would 
receive a share of the bank profit instead.  In the Khan and Mirakhor model, a shock to real 
income in both types of bank may deliver short-run differences between the two. In 
particular, Islamic banks do not necessarily need to resort to the liability-management 
technique of raising interest rates to bid on deposits, a short-run process that they claim 
                                                          
9 The empirical results in the next part report the implied response of non-Islamic bank profits separately. 
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would lead to instability. In sum, theoretically shocks in the assets value would be passed 
through to the liability side, leaving the system stable. Based on this argument, the expected 
sign and magnitude of the estimated parameters ˆ  and ˆ would be those which imply more 
unstable profitability of a non-Islamic bank.  Nevertheless, the stability of bank profitability 
may well be influenced by their own individual characteristics, which may or may not be 
related to them being Islamic or non-Islamic. For this reason, model (1.1) also includes bank 
characteristics as possible explanatory and control variables. 
The same interpretation of parameter   also applies to   on the interaction of bank 
characteristics with the business cycle variable, which explains how different bank 
characteristics may respond differently to the business cycle. Though our main objective is 
to capture the stability and volatility of bank profitability through fluctuations in the business 
cycle, model (1.1) provides this by estimation of the level of profitability rather than directly 
of its volatility.
10
 By so doing, not only does it preserve the available time observation, it 
also allows estimation of the effect of bank characteristics on volatility of bank profitability 
through   and on level of profitability through  , based on the assumption that the 
business cycle variable Z  could capture most of the variability of bank profitability. While 
other studies in the literature do not generally focus explicitly on the effect of the business 
cycle on bank profitability due to its cross-country and short time dimension nature, the 
available observation and frequency of this study allows more elaboration, in particular the 
ability to measure the short-run effect alongside the long-run effect.  
The bank characteristics included in the estimation are (i) capital, (ii) size, (iii) credit 
risk, and (iv) loan-to-asset ratio. The latter may represent bank product diversification and 
also signals its liquidity condition. The first characteristic, capital, is measured by ratio of 
equity to total assets: the effect of capital on bank profitability is ambiguous. While capital 
can positively affect bank profitability through reducing the cost of external funding as 
capital may reflect lower risks, it may also negatively affect bank profitability through 
conventional risk-return hypothesis where banks with a lower capital ratio, and therefore 
                                                          
10 For robustness check, OLS estimation on standard deviation of individual bank profitability is also undertaken. 
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more risky, deliver higher returns in comparison to better-capitalized banks. Thus, the net 
effect of capital on bank profitability cannot be anticipated theoretically. The effect of 
capital on volatility of profitability is directly associated with its capacity as a proxy for risk, 
in which higher risk implies greater volatility. The second characteristic, size, is measured 
by ratio of a bank’s total assets to the average of industry’s assets. Generally, most studies 
suggest that bigger banks are able to generate higher profits, though this may not be in a 
linear manner as in Athanasoglou et al. (2008), and some relate size to capital, then, in turn, 
to profitability, as seen in Bikker and Hu (2002) and Goddard et al. (2004). The effect of 
size on the volatility of profitability is not straightforward, since there is no direct relation 
between bank size and its riskiness. However, we could follow previous studies by relating 
bank size to its capital and, in turn, to its risk position. Third, credit risk, measured by ratio 
of loan-loss provisions to total loans. This theory expects negative effects of credit risk on 
profitability, as lower credit quality reduces a bank’s ability to generate greater profit. The 
effect of credit risk on volatility is straightforward, as more risk is associated with higher 
volatility. Last, the loan-to-asset ratio is one of the measures for liquidity risk and product 
diversification.
11
 Again, a conventional risk-return hypothesis expects a higher loans-to-asset 
ratio, hence higher liquidity-risk, delivering a higher return and higher volatility. On the 
other hand, a higher loan-to-asset ratio reflects lower product diversification, and suggests 
that a higher product mix enables more stable revenue. Thus, according to this view, we 
expect a positive relation between the loan-to-asset ratio and bank profitability, and a 
negative relationship with its volatility. Overall, the effect of the loan-to-asset ratio is 
ambiguous. 
While the literature mainly explores the effect of bank characteristics on bank 
profitability, it rarely directly examines the effect of these characteristic on stability or 
sensitivity of bank profit on the business cycle.
12
 The empirical model specification in model 
                                                          
11 Another common measure of liquidity risk is ratio of liquid assets such as cash, bank deposits and securities to 
total assets, as in among others Bourke (1989) and Molyneux and Thornton (1992).  
12 Some of these studies look at the effect of product diversification on profit stability in a similar way with 
analysis in non-financial firms. Others examine bank stability based on probability of default or z-score 
mentioned previously. 
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(1.1) allows estimation of the effect of these characteristics on both – bank profitability and 
its volatility across time in a single equation. In order to observe the partial effect of each 
particular characteristic on the estimated parameter ˆ , and as a parsimony model is 
preferred to a more general one, the inclusion of bank characteristics is done by introducing 
one characteristic at a time.
13
   
Due to the monthly data frequency and relatively long period of observation, the time 
series component of the estimation needs to be treated carefully for the model to be correctly 
specified. With this in mind, and supported by the literature of persistence in bank profits 
(see, among others, Berger et al. (2000), Goddard et al. (2011) and  Athanasoglou et al. 
(2008)), model (1.1) is augmented to dynamic form as the following: 
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where lijt  are the lags of bank profitability, while the explanatory variables also 
enter the equation with the necessary number of lags based on a statistical test, except for the 
NI dummy. Profit persistent implies parameter   in model (1.2) to be non-zero, thus the 
model exhibits dynamic panel which includes lagged of dependent variable.  
Though ignoring serial correlation does not lead to inconsistency, it would impair 
efficiency, bias the standard error, and thus inflate the resulting t-statistics. On the other 
hand, the inclusion of the lagged dependent variable has its own drawback through 
incorrectly “dominate” the regression by obscuring the actual relationship (Beck, 2005). For 
this reason, it is strongly suggested that a model with a lagged dependent variable is done 
based on theoretical consideration or valid checks of the residual structure that leads to the 
necessity of dynamic estimation. Based on this, to check the validity of using the dynamic 
model (1.2), the static model (1.1) is first estimated to see whether the resulting residuals are 
serially correlated using test for first order serial correlation in linear fixed (or random)-
effects panel-data by Wooldridge (2002). The test for serial correlation shows that the null of 
no serial correlation is strongly rejected with F-statistics and p-value equal to 45.045 and 
                                                          
13 Having parsimonious model is one of the ways in avoiding problem of too-many instruments explained below.  
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0.000, respectively. Further, in order to find the appropriate dynamic specification, test for 
stationarity on each variable are undertaken by using a unit-root test for the unbalanced 
panel by Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003). The test results (Table A1.1 in the Appendix 1) show 
that ROA and all the control variables are stationary in level and that the maximum lag is 
around 1. The business cycle variables, explained in the next section, are differenced- 
stationary; thus we use the percentage of monthly growth in the estimation. These results 
lead us to use an autoregressive distributed lags (ADL) model of order (1, 1). This particular 
model is very convenient as it provides estimation of short-run and long-run effects on 
stationary data in a single equation Error Corrections Model (ECM).  Thus, model (2) can be 
rewritten as the following:
14
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In estimating model (1.3), the fixed effect method, commonly used in the literature 
around this topic, gives rise to dynamic panel bias or ‘Nickell bias’ (see Nickell, 1981), 
especially for small T and large N panel, and inconsistent estimates (see Baltagi, 2001). To 
obviate such problems, model (1.3) is estimated using the dynamic panel estimation method 
suggested by Blundell and Bond (1998), which was initially outlined in Arellano and Bover 
(1995). This method offers greater efficiency than the earlier method by Arellano and Bond 
(1991) (see Roodman, 2009), particularly in the case of the dependent variable, which is 
close to random walk.
15
 The method uses lagged values of dependent variable in levels, as 
well as in differences in instruments. It also allows possible forms of endogeneity of the 
control variables, such as capital and size, by applying the same technique used in 
instrumenting the lagged dependent variable.
 16
 In order to get the right specification, we 
apply Hausman test for each model with a control variable. The test is based on the 
                                                          
14As a simple example for the baseline estimation which does not include any control variable, the difference in 
short-run effect of business cycle to bank profitability is 
0  and the long-run effect is )1/()( 10   . The 
same rules apply for other parameters. 
15 The next section on empirical results shows that the first lagged of the dependent variable in (2) is indeed have 
high value with ˆ up to 0.9. 
16 Garcia-Herrero et al. (2009) suggests that banks with higher profitability may more easily increase their capital 
and also may be more able to expand their size.  
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assumption that the correct specification for the control variable is full-exogeneity. Treating 
the control variable as predetermined is consistent, whether or not the assumption is true, 
and treating it as exogenous is only efficient and consistent if, and only if, the assumption is 
true.  
Nevertheless, caution should be exercised when determining the number of lags used 
as instruments. The difference and system GMM approaches are prone to too many 
instrument problems (see Roodman, 2009), in which a longer time period aggravates the 
problem of instrument proliferation. The large number of instruments may fail to obliterate 
their endogenous components, which leads to a bias estimated coefficient toward those of 
non-instrumenting estimator. One of the symptoms of this too-many instrument problem is 
the implausibly high p -values of 1.000 of the Hansen test (Bowsher, 2002). One of the 
ways to avoid such a problem is that, as an arbitrary rule of thumb, the number of 
instruments may not exceed the number of individuals in the panels. For this reason, we 
restrict the lags range used and collapse the instrument matrix. The number of instruments 
used in estimation is reported alongside the Hansen test p -value. 
The empirical work includes two parts of analysis. The first part is intended to 
investigate the dynamic of individual bank profitability using business cycle variables which 
come from outside the banking sector for the variable tZ ; thus, they may entail different 
short-run and long-run effects.  We employ the dynamic specification in (1.3), which allows 
estimation of short-run and long-run responses simultaneously.  The second part, as 
robustness check, estimates the static model (1.1). This time the average banking sector 
profitability is used for tZ  variable. Since the relationship between individual bank 
profitability and the average profitability of the total banking industry is mostly identical 
across time, using static specifications as in (1.1) is appropriate, though may not be efficient. 
This estimation is intended to investigate the general comparison of profits stability across 
the two banking groups during the regression period. However, the small number of Islamic 
banks in the sample may weaken the significance or the statistical power of this static 
estimation. 
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We also do another robustness check of the results with respect to the selected sample. 
Beck et al. (2009) finds that, using banks in Germany as the sample, government banks are 
more stable than privately owned banks. On the other hand, Iannotta et.al (2007) on cross-
countries European banks, suggests that government banks have poorer loan quality and 
higher insolvency risk than other types of banks. To account for these, we estimate the same 
regressions of each part for two sample sets with different bank ownership or institutional 
types. In particular, for the first sample (Sample1) we include all banks, while for the second 
sample (Sample2) we exclude government banks and regional development banks.
17
  
 
 
1.3.2 Data 
The data source is the monthly bank reports to the central bank of Indonesia (Bank 
Indonesia, 2007-2012b), which is an obligatory report for every bank. The period covered is 
from January 2007 to October 2012, i.e. seventy periods. The sample considers 138 
commercial banks, of which 11 are Islamic banks.
18
 This data set comprehensively includes 
all banks which are operating in the period of observation. For cases of mergers and 
acquisition, the newly formed bank has the same identity number with the main bank. For 
cases of conversions, the same number of identity is used but with different values in the NI 
dummy variable. During the observation periods, 7 non-Islamic banks converted to Islamic 
banks and 1 Islamic window spun-off to full-fledged Islamic bank. The non-Islamic banks 
consist of 5 government banks, 26 regional development banks and 101 private banks, while 
the Islamic banks are all privately-owned banks. The exclusion of government and regional 
development banks from Sample1 leaves the non-Islamic banks and Islamic banks to be 
more comparable in term of ownership structure since now, in Sample2, both types solely 
consist of privately-owned banks. The panel is unbalanced since there are some bank 
                                                          
17 For government banks the ownership is 100% central government while for regional development banks the 
majority of shareholders is the regional government. 
18 For technical reason, the Islamic banks in the sample only consider full-fledged Islamic bank and excludes 
Islamic windows or business unit of non-Islamic banks. 
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closures during the period of observations, consisting of 8674 observations for Sample1 and 
6472 observations for Sample2. 
Following the usual practice in the literature the profitability variable is represented 
by the ratio of profits to assets, i.e. the return on assets, ROA, (Golin, 2001), measured by the 
annualized profit before tax divided by average assets in percentage value. The possible 
variability of the denominator may obscure the actual variability of profits in the numerator. 
Therefore, for additional robustness check, we also estimate the baseline dynamic model 
with the annualized profits as dependent variable for both Sample1 and Sample2 (Table 
A1.4 in the Appendix 1). 
There are some issues regarding the monthly data which caused the calculated ROA in 
January to exhibit far larger absolute values than in other periods for most of the banks. This 
phenomenon, known as the “January-effect” (Bank Indonesia, 2006a), could be initiated by 
several aspects that affect the calculated ROA through bank total assets, or, more directly, 
through bank profits which are outlined in the following. The effect that works through bank 
total assets is that, in general, banks experience a drop in their deposits and total loans at the 
beginning of a year. The drop in deposits is due to a bank’s high dependency on the 
realisation of government spending, which reaches its lowest level in January, particularly 
for government banks and in turn affects the whole industry since these government banks 
are account up to around 40% of the whole industry.
19
 On the other hand, the drop in loans is 
due to a bank’s business plan, where January is often reserved for internal consolidation 
causing lower loans decisions. Largely, small banks are more prone to these drops, which 
may actually lead to a loss in that particular month. Equally important, the drop in bank 
loans is also due to lower deposits as the main source of funds for the supply of loans. The 
effect that possibly works through bank profits is related to another “January-effect” that 
occurs in the financial market and which mainly affects those banks with high trading 
activities.
 20,21
 Hence, the January data does not govern or predict data for the remaining 
                                                          
19 See the Outlook of Indonesian Islamic banks 2012 (Bank Indonesia, 2012) for January effect as an explanation 
of a drop in Islamic banks deposits during January 2011. 
20 “A seasonal anomaly in which stock’s prices increase in the month of January more than in any other month” 
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/January_effect). 
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months in a year. Based on these conditions, the January data is corrected by taking the 
average of the months preceding and following January. These corrections are identically 
applied to both groups, Islamic and non-Islamic banks.  
The business cycle variable is represented by the industrial production index, which 
measures changes in real production of large- and medium-scale non-oil manufacturing 
firms in Indonesia. This index is available in monthly periods and based on the monthly 
survey by a non-departmental government institution (Statistics Indonesia, 2012). The 
manufacturing or industrial sector contributes about a quarter of total Indonesian GDP, and 
around 20% of the total loans of the Indonesian banking industry are dedicated to this 
particular sector. This sector is highly sensitive to market conditions and consumer demand, 
especially private investment, which makes the index not only reflecting the manufacturing 
sector but also a good proxy for overall economic performance (Bank Indonesia, 2010). The 
index is often used by the central bank as one of the indicators for the real sector’s activities 
in formulating monetary policy (Bank Indonesia, 2006b). In addition, another proxy for a 
business cycle variable that is also considered is the total domestic consumption of cement 
in real value, which roughly represents the construction sector. However, this sector only 
accounts for around 6% of total GDP and around 5% of the total bank loans. Nevertheless, 
cement sales’ monthly data is also commonly used as an indicator for tracking Indonesian 
domestic demand.  
Table 1.3.1 reports the descriptive statistics for the variables used in the estimation 
and test the difference in mean values of non-Islamic and Islamic banks in both sample sets, 
Sample1 and Sample2. On average, the ROA of non-Islamic banks is significantly higher 
than those of Islamic banks and with bigger variations in both sample sets. The coefficient-
of-variations, i.e. the ratio of mean to standard deviation, of non-Islamic banks’ ROA are 
1.615 and 2.402, for Sample1 and Sample2 respectively, both are larger than 1.349 of 
Islamic banks’. These coefficient-of-variations imply that non-Islamic government and 
regional banks’ variation of ROA is less than the privately-owned ones, and that in both 
                                                                                                                                                                    
21 See Nagasastra and Utami (2012) who investigate the existence of the January-effect in the Indonesian capital 
market. 
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sample sets Islamic banks tend to have less variation of ROA in comparison to non-Islamic 
banks. In addition, a simple regression on 12 months standard deviation of ROA also shows 
that non-Islamic banks tend to have higher volatility of ROA, in particular in Sample2 (Table 
A1.2 in the Appendix 1).  
Table 1.3.1 Summary statistics  
  Non-Islamic
a)
 
Islamic
b)
 
 
Sample1 Sample2 
Variables Mean Std.dev Mean Std.dev Mean Std.dev 
π (ROA) 2.30*** 3.71 1.69** 4.06 1.25 1.69 
CAR 17.38* 19.49 19.96 21.98 18.69 15.58 
LLP 3.55*** 6.78 3.67*** 7.84 2.26 1.94 
LAR 56.66*** 16.77 57.59*** 17.59 81.66 24.49 
SIZE 1.04*** 2.61 0.61*** 1.05 0.37 0.42 
 
Number of small banks / Total banks in group 
SMALL 70/128 57/96 7/11 
Description             
π (ROA) Ratio of profits before tax to average assets (%)   
CAR Ratio of total equity to total assets (%)   
LLP Ratio of loan-loss provisions to total loans (%)  
LAR Ratio of total loans to total assets (%)   
SIZE Ratio of assets to the average of industry's assets   
SMALL Small bank if total assets < IDR5000 billions 
Note: a) Non-Islamic banks consist of government, regional and private banks; b) Islamic 
banks are all private banks. Sample1 consists of all banks, while Sample2 exclude 
government and regional banks. The difference between mean value of Non-Islamic and 
Islamic banks that is significant at 1%, 5% and 10% are marked with ***, **, and * 
respectively.  
 
In terms of assets size, Islamic banks on average are smaller than non-Islamic banks. 
The difference is more apparent in Sample1 since most of the government banks are large 
banks. Though the mean tests of SIZE variable show significant differences between non-
Islamic and Islamic banks, the difference is relatively smaller in Sample2. If we categorize 
banks as small for assets size less than IDR 5000 billion, the ratio of small banks to total 
banks of non-Islamic banks in Sample2 is around 60% similar with the number of small 
banks in Islamic banks group which is around 63%, while in Sample1 this ratio is around 
18 
 
54%. These ratios indicate that non-Islamic and Islamic banks in the Sample2 are also more 
comparable in term of their assets size. 
The capital-to-assets ratio, CAR, of non-Islamic banks is statistically lower than non-
Islamic banks at 10% level of significance in Sample1. This implies that Islamic banks, in 
general, have higher capital cushions than their conventional counterparts, reflecting lower 
risks, and in relation to its profitability, may indicate support for the conventional risk-return 
hypothesis. For ratio of loan-loss provisions to total loans, LLP, Islamic banks have a 
statistically significant lower average value to those of non-Islamic banks in both Sample1 
and Sample2, suggesting lower credit risk. On the other hand, the average loan-to-asset ratio, 
LAR, of Islamic banks reaches more than 80%, much higher than the average non-Islamic 
bank in both samples. The high value of LAR in Islamic banks could presumably be one of 
the consequences of complying with the Islamic finance principles. In particular, the 
prohibition on interest, the real asset-linked or ‘materiality’ principles and the prohibition on 
speculative transactions are, in turn, restraining the choice of sharia-compliant products, 
limiting product diversification on Islamic bank operations, so that Islamic banks may not 
have as many choices as non-Islamic banks for their assets portfolio and mainly concentrate 
on loans. In addition, there are very limited sharia-compliant securities available in the 
Indonesian market due to sharia-compliant issues.
22
 This distinct background of the loan-to-
asset ratio across the two banking groups makes it a good candidate for an explanatory 
variable in explaining any differences between variability in profitability of Islamic and non-
Islamic banks, rather than merely functioning as a control variable. 
 
                                                          
22 This shallow market-for-liquidity problem is not solely endured by Indonesian Islamic banking sector but also 
in other jurisdictions, as stated in the Islamic Financial Service Board, Guiding Principles of Liquidity Risks 
(IFSB, 2012). 
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1.4 Empirical Results 
1.4.1 Dynamic Estimations 
This part of empirical work aims at investigating the dynamics of individual bank 
profitability and exploring any difference in the dynamic response of the two banking groups 
across business cycles. In order to check for the dynamic specification, OLS and Within 
Group estimations are applied to provide the credible range for the lag dependent variable.
23
 
Estimations of the baseline model use the growth of industrial production index, IPI, and of 
domestic cement consumption, CMT, as business cycle variables. Since results are fairly 
similar, only estimations with IPI are shown in the estimations with control variables. 
Overall, the system GMM estimator works well with estimated coefficient of the 
lagged dependant variable fall within the credible range as in Bond (2002) for all the 
estimation with a relatively stable value. The Wald-test indicates reasonably well goodness-
of-fit and the Hansen-test for over-identifying restriction shows appropriately chosen 
instruments with no sign of too-many instruments and weak instruments problems 
encountered. However, while the significance of AR(1) tests is expected, the rejection of the 
null for AR(2) indicates that the idiosyncratic error follows first-order serial correlation in 
level although we have included the necessary lags based on unit-root test results. This 
significant serial-correlation would render the second lag invalid as instrument and would 
result in inconsistency (Arellano and Bond, 1991). Nevertheless, using deeper lags as 
instruments would keep the estimator consistent, since the assumption of instruments-error 
exogeneity is still valid and the errors are uncorrelated across banks. For this reason, the lags 
used as instruments are third lag and deeper. Another overall performance observed is that 
almost none of the implied long-run effect is significant, partly because the long-run effect is 
very sensitive to the rate of convergence. According to Bond et al. (2001), there is “a great 
deal of uncertainty in measuring convergences rates” (p.22). In addition, the long-run effects 
are more prone to possible reverse causation. 
                                                          
23 Although the dynamic specification checks are undertaken for all estimations, to save space we only provide 
the results for the baseline estimation on Sample1.    
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Table 1.4.1(a) shows the baseline estimations with growth of IPI and CMT using two-
step GMM and provides the dynamic specification check using OLS and Within Group on 
Sample1.
24
 The estimated coefficients of the lagged dependent variable for IPI and CMT are 
the same. It is highly significant with a value of 0.917 (row (1), columns (3) and (6)) and fall 
within the credible range of 0.870-0.925 (row (1), columns (1)-(2) and (4)-(5)) with much 
smaller standard errors. This estimated value is associated with a speed of adjustment of 
around 0.083 periods, which implies that, after a shock, bank profitability will return to its 
long-run equilibrium in around 12 months. These results may indicate that annual 
persistency in Indonesian bank profitability is quite limited.  
 
Table 1.4.1(a) Results of dynamic baseline estimation using growth of: Industrial Production 
Index (IPI) and real domestic cement consumption (CMT) in Sample1 
      Z: ΔIPI     Z: ΔCMT   
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
    OLS OLS-FE BB OLS OLS-FE BB 
(1) πit-1 0.925*** 0.870*** 0.917*** 0.925*** 0.870*** 0.917*** 
  
(0.0298) (0.0481) (0.0160) (0.0298) (0.0481) (0.0159) 
(2) (Z x NI)t 0.0154 0.0149** 0.0152** 0.00469 0.00413 0.00467* 
  
(0.00941) (0.00670) (0.00655) (0.00348) (0.00253) (0.00259) 
 
(Z x NI)t-1 0.00107 0.00141 0.000630 -0.00219 -0.00228 -0.00199 
  
(0.00777) (0.00613) (0.00577) (0.00342) (0.00264) (0.00241) 
(3) Zt -0.00213 -0.00167 -0.00223 -0.00260 -0.00210 -0.00261 
  
(0.00799) (0.00581) (0.00568) (0.00327) (0.00231) (0.00245) 
 
Zt-1 -0.00370 -0.00354 -0.00380 0.00153 0.00175 0.00149 
  
(0.00607) (0.00511) (0.00507) (0.00321) (0.00242) (0.00220) 
Observations 8,542 8,542 8,542 8,542 8,542 8,542 
R-squared 0.860 0.759 - 0.860 0.759 - 
Number of ID - 132 132 - 132 132 
ABAR(1) p-value     0.001     0.001 
ABAR(2) p-value 
  
0.054 
  
0.055 
Hansen test p-value     0.806     0.81 
Note: For OLS and OLS-FE: clustered standard error in parentheses, for BB: robust two-step standard error with 
small-sample correction in parentheses. Coefficient that are significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5% and 
10% level are marked with ***, **, and * respectively. All estimations include NI dummy and a constant. The 
Blundel-Bond (BB) system-GMM is two-step estimates with forward orthogonal deviation. All BB estimations 
use lags 3 and 4 as instrument (9 total number of instruments). The Hansen test is the test for overidentifying 
restrictions. ABAR(1) and ABAR(2) refer to Arellano-Bond test for autocorrelation of order 1 and 2 respectively, 
with null of no autocorrelation.  
                                                          
24 Windmeijer (2005) finds a small-sample correction method that makes two-step GMM estimator modestly 
superior to robust one-step. Previously before the correction, the standard errors are downward biased when the 
number of instrument is large (Arellano and Bond, 1991). 
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Table 1.4.1(b) provides the baseline GMM estimations and the implied responses of 
ROA to IPI and CMT on Sample1 and Sample2. The coefficients of interest, the interaction 
terms of business cycle variables with dummy NI in current period (row (2), columns (1)-
(4)) are significant in both sample sets at 5% and 10% level of significance for IPI and CMT, 
respectively. Thus, there is evidence that Islamic and non-Islamic banks have different short-
run responses to shocks on both IPI and CMT. These results confirm that non-Islamic banks’ 
profitability is less stable than Islamic banks in the short-run. For 10% monthly growth of 
IPI, there is an additional increase of 15 bps and 20 bps on non-Islamic banks’ ROA in 
Sample1 (column (1)) and Sample2 (column (2)), respectively. For CMT the differences are 
even smaller, only up to a 5 bps increase on non-Islamic banks’ ROA in both sample sets 
(columns (3) and (4)). Nevertheless, the implied differences in long-run effects (row (6)) are 
generally not statistically significant for both business cycle variables, except for IPI in 
Sample2 (column (2)). These insignificant results may well be related to the sensitivity of 
the rate of convergence discussed above. 
The implied responses of non-Islamic banks to the business cycle in the short-run are 
significant at 1% level of significance for IPI in both sample sets (row 4, columns (1) and 
(2)) and for CMT in Sample2 (row 4, column (4)), and at 5% level of significance for CMT 
in Sample1 (row (4), column (3)). These short-run responses are procyclical, as expected, 
albeit fairly small for at most 17 bps increases in ROA for every 10% monthly growth of IPI 
(row (4), column (2)). As for the implied long-run effects, the responses of non-Islamic 
banks are also statistically significant at 10% and 5% level of significance in Sample1 and 
Sample2, respectively (row (7), columns (1) and (2)). While for Islamic banks neither the 
short-run nor the long-run response is significantly different from zero (rows (5) and (8)). 
Yet this does not necessarily imply that Islamic banks’ revenues are unaffected by business 
cycles, as we shall see in the results which consider control variables in the model.  
These baseline results for the dynamic estimation are supported by the same 
regressions on annualized profits as the numerator of ROA. The results in Table A1.4 of the 
Appendix 1 show that non-Islamic banks’ profits have larger response to IPI in the short-run 
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in comparison to Islamic banks in both sample sets, but the implied differences are not 
significant in the long-run. 
Overall, the baseline estimations show stronger results on Sample2, especially in the 
case with IPI as the business cycle variable. Not only that the estimated short-run difference 
is larger in Sample2 than in Sample1, the test on implied effects shows that these differences 
are also statistically significant in the long-run at 10% level of significance (row (9), column 
(2)). These results indicate that the choice of banks in the sample set is important. By 
choosing more comparable banks across the two groups the potential difference could be 
better revealed. 
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Table 1.4.1(b) Results of dynamic baseline estimation in Sample1 and Sample2 
    Z: ΔIPI Z: ΔCMT 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
    Sample1 Sample2 Sample1 Sample2 
(1) πit-1 0.917*** 0.912*** 0.917*** 0.910*** 
  
(0.016) (0.019) (0.0159) (0.020) 
(2) (Z x NI)t 0.015** 0.020*** 0.005* 0.005* 
  
(0.007) (0.007) (0.003) (0.003) 
 
(Z x NI)t-1 0.001 0.003 -0.002 0.002 
  
(0.006) (0.006) (0.002) (0.002) 
(3) Zt -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 
  
(0.006) (0.006) (0.002) (0.003) 
 
Zt-1 -0.004 -0.004 0.001 -0.002 
  
(0.005) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) 
Observations 8,542 6,372 8,542 6,372 
Number of ID 132 100 132 100 
Implied short-run effects 
   (4) NI  0.013*** 0.017*** 0.002** 0.003*** 
  
(0.003) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) 
(5) I -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
  
(0.006) (0.006) (0.002) (0.003) 
Implied long-run effects 
   (6) Z x NI 0.191 0.254* 0.033 0.088 
  
(0.117) (0.130) (0.032) (0.062) 
(7) NI 0.118* 0.185** 0.019 0.037 
  
(0.065) (0.087) (0.014) (0.023) 
(8) I -0.073 -0.069 -0.014 -0.051 
  
(0.089) (0.084) (0.027) (0.049) 
Test that long-run effects equal to short-run effects: Chi2(1) (p-value) 
(9) Z x NI 2.47 3.51* 0.8 1.98 
  
(0.116) (0.061) (0.371) (0.160) 
(10) NI 2.78 4.00** 1.48 2.26 
  
(0.096) (0.045) (0.224) (0.133) 
(11) I 0.69 0.69 0.18 1.09 
    (0.406) (0.407) (0.670) (0.296) 
ABAR(1) p-value 0.001 0.003 0.001 0.002 
ABAR(2) p-value 0.054 0.064 0.055 0.064 
Hansen test p-value 0.806 0.819 0.81 0.827 
Note: Blundel-Bond (BB) two-steps system GMM with forward orthogonal deviation. Robust two-
step standard error with small-sample correction in parentheses. Coefficient that are significantly 
different from zero at the 1%, 5% and 10% level are marked with ***, **, and * respectively. All 
estimations include NI dummy and a constant; use lags 3 and 4 as instruments. The Hansen test is 
the test for overidentifying restrictions. ABAR(1) and ABAR(2) refer to Arellano-Bond test for 
autocorrelation of order 1 and 2 respectively, with null of no autocorrelation. The standard errors for 
the implied effects were calculated using the Delta method. Sample1 consists of all banks; Sample2 
consists of private banks. The values in rows (9)-(11) are Chi2 statistics with 1 degree of freedom 
and the associating p-values are in parentheses. 
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Table 1.4.2 shows the estimation results of model (1.3) using growth of IPI as a 
business cycle variable with inclusions of control variables one at a time which are shown in 
separate columns. This strategy is undertaken to limit the number of instruments in order to 
avoid the too-many instruments problem explained in the previous section, and to have a 
better knowledge of which control variable of bank characteristics could actually serve as an 
explanatory variable in explaining any differences in profitability variation between Islamic 
and non-Islamic banks. The intuition is that any bank characteristics in which inclusion 
renders the observed difference could be a good candidate for an explanatory variable.  
Overall, the estimated coefficients of interest, the interaction term of IPI and dummy 
NI (row (2), columns (1) - (6)), are significant in the short run at a minimum of 5% level of 
significance, with relatively stable values around 14.9-15.5 bps and 17.6-20 bps differences 
in ROA for each 10% monthly growth of IPI in Sample1 and Sample2, respectively. 
Exceptionally for LAR (columns (7) – (8)), the inclusions of control variables do not change 
the short-run significant results. However, similar with the results of baseline estimations, 
the implied long-run differences are generally not significant (row (8)), except for SIZE in 
Sample2 (row (8), column (6)). For the full-exogeneity assumption of each control variable, 
the Hausman tests support the model with full-exogeneity assumption.
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The estimations with capital-to-assets ratio, CAR, as control variable are shown in 
column (1) and column (2) for Sample1 and Sample2, respectively. The regression results 
show that the inclusion of CAR does not alter the significance of the estimated coefficients 
of the interaction between IPI and NI dummy in row (2). While CAR seems insignificantly 
affect bank profitability, it does deliver higher volatility to bank profitability alongside the 
movement of IPI. However, the estimated parameters are fairly negligible, where a 10% 
increase in CAR only delivers around 0.5 bps additional ROA, and relatively weak at 10% 
level of significance (row (3)) in both sample sets. This indicates that banks with higher 
CAR achieve slightly higher profits in good times. Table 1.3.1 of summary statistics shows 
                                                          
25The Hausman test p-values for null of no systematic difference between modelling CAR, LLP and LAR as 
predetermined or exogenous are 0.999, 0.3327 and 0.983, respectively for Sample1; and are 1.000, 0.1326 and 
1.000, respectively for Sample2. 
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that Islamic banks on average have marginally higher CAR than non-Islamic banks, yet this 
does not erode the significant short-run difference on the effect of business cycle to bank 
profitability.  
Similar results are found from the inclusion of credit risks, LLP, in column (3) and (4) 
for Sample1 and Sample2, respectively. The estimated coefficients on the interacted 
parameter of interest in row (2) are still significant, with reasonably unaffected magnitudes 
in comparison to the baseline case. In addition, as the theory expects, LLP decreases bank 
profitability. A 10% increase in LLP is associated with 173 bps subtraction off a bank’s ROA 
at 1% level of significance in the short-run for Sample1 (row (5), column (3)). The result for 
Sample2 is fairly similar with slightly smaller effect of LLP to ROA and at a lower level of 
significance (row (5), column (4)). 
Inclusion of control variable that represents assets size, shown in column (5) and (6), 
also could not explain the significant short-run differences. On the other hand, the results 
show that profitability of larger banks is significantly less sensitive to business cycle 
fluctuation. In particular, a bank which is 10 times larger than the average size of banks in 
the industry show 2 bps less short-run responses on their ROA to 10% growth of IPI for 
Sample1 at 1% level of significance, while the number is 3 bps for Sample2 at 5% level of 
significance (row (3), column (5) and (6), respectively). Apparently, economies of scale that 
work through higher loans diversification may provide stability for larger banks. However, 
unlike the previous results on other control variables, the implied long-run difference in 
Sample2 is statistically significant at 10% level (row (8), column (6)). In addition, similar 
with the baseline estimation, the test on the implied effects shows that the estimated 
interaction terms of IPI and dummy NI in the short-run and in the long-run are statistically 
different at 10% level of significance (row (8), column (6)). 
The estimations with loan-to-asset ratio, LAR, for Sample1 and Sample2 are shown in 
column (7) and (8), respectively. Contrary to previous results, the inclusion of LAR 
eliminates the significance of any difference in short-run business cycle effects across the 
two types of banks (row (2)).  In addition, the estimated coefficient on the interaction-term 
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of IPI and LAR in row (3) shows that 10% higher LAR slightly reduces business cycle 
sensitivity of bank profitability around 0.5 bps and 0.6 bps at 1% level of significance in 
Sample1 and Sample2, respectively. This statistically significant finding supports the view 
of previous studies by DeYoung and Roland (2001), and Stiroh (2004), which conclude that 
banks with lower products mix actually have lower revenue volatility. The reason behind 
these findings is that revenues from traditional lending businesses are relatively more stable 
over time due to a more stable bank-costumer relationship. On the other hand, this result 
stands in opposition to Cihak and Hesse (2008), who assert that banks with higher LAR tend 
to have a higher risk of insolvency. Moreover, higher LAR is also associated with a higher 
liquidity risk. The empirical evidence from this study may indicate that in the short-run the 
adverse effect of liquidity risk is falling behind the benefits of traditional lending activities, 
though in a fairly limited magnitude. Table 1.3.1 shows that Islamic banks on average have a 
notably higher LAR, around 24-25% higher, than average non-Islamic banks in both sample 
sets. As explained previously, this observed difference originated from Islamic banks 
adhering to Islamic finance principles which, in turn, constrain their assets-portfolio. Based 
on this inherent difference and the regression result, which shows that banks with higher 
LAR have more stable profitability amid the business cycle, the inclusion of LAR actually 
explains the different responses of Islamic banks and non-Islamic banks to business cycle 
fluctuations in the short-run. Hence, LAR could serve as a good candidate of an explanatory 
variable, in which according to estimated coefficient in row (3) this higher LAR explains up 
to 1.28 bps and 1.46 bps lower response of Islamic banks’ ROA in comparison to the average 
of non-Islamic banks in Sample1 and Sample2, respectively.  Also different from previous 
results, the inclusion of LAR entails significant, procyclical effects of bank profitability to 
business cycle on both types of banks in which 10% monthly growth of IPI is associated by 
around 4 - 5 bps increase in banks’ ROA (rows (6) and (7), non-Islamic and Islamic banks, 
respectively) . 
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Table 1.4.2 Results of dynamic estimation using growth of Industrial Production Index in Sample1 and Sample2  
    X: CAR X: LLP X: SIZE X: LAR 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
    Sample1 Sample2 Sample1 Sample2 Sample1 Sample2 Sample1 Sample2 
(1) πit-1 0.918*** 0.913*** 0.900*** 0.888*** 0.906*** 0.899*** 0.911*** 0.906*** 
  
(0.0401) (0.0435) (0.0516) (0.0630) (0.0261) (0.0278) (0.0451) (0.0479) 
(2) (ΔIPI x NI)t 0.0149** 0.0176** 0.0155** 0.020*** 0.0151** 0.020*** 0.0006 0.0017 
  
(0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) 
 
(ΔIPI x NI)t-1 -0.0005 0.0024 0.0014 0.0038 0.0005 0.0031 0.0020 0.0055 
  
(0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) 
(3) (ΔIPI x Xi)t 0.0005* 0.0005* 0.0001 0.0003 -0.002*** -0.003** -0.0005*** -0.0006*** 
  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
(ΔIPI x Xi)t-1 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0011 -0.0009 0.0002 -0.0008 0.0001 0.0001 
  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
(4) ΔIPIt -0.0119 -0.0116 -0.0038 -0.0040 -0.0014 -0.0001 0.0397** 0.052*** 
  
(0.008) (0.009) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.016) (0.019) 
 
ΔIPIt-1 0.0019 0.0021 -0.0014 -0.0018 -0.0038 -0.0032 -0.0097 -0.0152 
  
(0.008) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.017) (0.022) 
(5) Xit 0.0017 0.0021 -0.173*** -0.163** -0.0091 0.0788 -0.0008 -0.0009 
  
(0.002) (0.002) (0.062) (0.069) (0.099) (0.151) (0.006) (0.006) 
 
Xit-1 -0.0017 -0.0014 0.173*** 0.162** 0.0174 -0.0549 0.0015 0.0015 
    (0.002) (0.001) (0.065) (0.075) (0.099) (0.147) (0.006) (0.006) 
Observations 8,502 6,332 8,487 6,317 8,542 6,372 8,523 6,353 
Number of ID 132 100 132 100 132 100 132 100 
Notes: Blundel-Bond (BB) system GMM with forward orthogonal deviation; robust two-step standard error for small-sample correction in 
parentheses. Coefficient that are significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5% and 10% level are marked with ***, **, and * respectively. All 
estimations include NI dummy and a constant; use lags 3 to 5 as instruments for πit-1, and assume that other regressors as exogenous. Sample1 consists 
of all banks; Sample2 consists of private banks. 
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Table 1.4.2 Continued 
    X: CAR X: LLP X: SIZE X: LAR 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
    Sample1 Sample2 Sample1 Sample2 Sample1 Sample2 Sample1 Sample2 
Implied short-run effects 
       (6) NI 0.0036 0.0065 0.012*** 0.016*** 0.012*** 0.016*** 0.040*** 0.053*** 
  
(0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.011) (0.014) 
(7) I -0.0113 -0.011 -0.004 -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 0.039** 0.051*** 
  
(0.008) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.016) (0.019) 
Implied long-run effects 
       (8) ΔIPI x NI 0.176 0.228 0.170 0.208 0.167 0.223* 0.0300 0.0765 
  
(0.142) (0.162) (0.120) (0.139) (0.108) (0.119) (0.109) (0.117) 
(9) NI 0.0573 0.121 0.107* 0.150* 0.096* 0.152** 0.363 0.464 
  
(0.085) (0.127) (0.064) (0.088) (0.058) (0.075) (0.271) (0.339) 
(10) I -0.119 -0.107 -0.062 -0.058 -0.071 -0.072 0.333 0.387 
  
(0.142) (0.132) (0.101) (0.089) (0.079) (0.073) (0.315) (0.365) 
Test that long-run effects equal to short-run effects: Chi2(1) (p-value) 
  (11) ΔIPI x NI   1.37 1.76 1.75 1.95 2.15 3.20* 0.08 0.45 
  
(0.242) (0.185) (0.186) (0.162) (0.143) (0.074) (0.778) (0.503) 
(12) NI             0.44 0.88 2.37 2.41 2.23 3.44* 1.49 1.53 
  
(0.507) (0.347) (0.124) (0.121) (0.135) (0.064) (0.222) (0.215) 
(13) I              0.62 0.57 0.37 0.41 0.8 0.98 0.92 0.9 
    (0.433) (0.452) (0.543) (0.520) (0.371) (0.322) (0.337) (0.343) 
ABAR(1) p-value 0.001 0.004 0.001 0.004 0.001 0.003 0.001 0.003 
ABAR(2) p-value 0.048 0.057 0.140 0.155 0.054 0.064 0.067 0.079 
Hansen test p-value 0.690 0.716 0.574 0.410 0.719 0.745 0.643 0.670 
Notes:  Coefficient that are significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5% and 10% level are marked with ***, **, and * respectively. The Hansen test 
is the test for overidentifying restrictions. ABAR(1) and ABAR(2) refer to Arellano-Bond test for autocorrelation of order 1 and 2 respectively, with 
null of no autocorrelation. The standard errors for the implied effects were calculated using the Delta method. 
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The results of dynamic estimations in this first part of analysis show that, while the 
differences in the responses of Islamic and non-Islamic banks to business cycle fluctuations 
are observed in the short-run (row (2) in Table 1.4.1 (a)-(b) and Table 1.4.2), overall there 
are little evidences of significant long-run differences (row (6) in Table 1.4.1 (b) and row (8) 
in Table 1.4.2), except for Sample2 in the baseline case and in the model that control for 
SIZE. Nonetheless, the significant short-run differences and the overall responses of bank’s 
ROA to evolution of IPI are fairly small. These dynamic results are somewhat reflected by 
the general results from static estimations in the robustness check from the second part of 
analysis. 
 
1.4.2 Static Estimations 
The static estimations use average profitability of the whole banking industry as the
tZ  variable.  This part of analysis is undertaken to generally explore and compare 
fluctuations of profitability across Islamic and non-Islamic banks. Table 1.4.3 shows the 
estimation results of model (1.1), with the inclusion of one bank characteristic at a time. 
Overall, although simple regression on volatility of ROA in Table A1.2 shows that 
non-Islamic banks tend to have higher profits volatility than Islamic banks, especially in 
Sample2, the static results show that there are no evidences of different fluctuations across 
the two groups. The estimated coefficients on the interaction terms of tZ with dummy NI are 
not different from zero (row (1), columns (1)-(10)). The baseline model, that excludes any 
control variable, shows that profitability of Islamic and non-Islamic banks generally 
fluctuate alongside each other as in the implied responses which are 0.999 and 1.056 in 
Sample1 (column (1)), and 1.085 and 0.873 in Sample2 (column (2)) for non-Islamic (row 
(5)) and Islamic (row (6)) banks, respectively. None of the inclusion of control variables 
affects the no-difference results. However, these weak results may be affected by the small 
number of Islamic banks (11 banks) in comparison to non-Islamic banks (128 banks in 
Sample1 and 96 banks in Sample2) which could trivialize their presence in the tZ  variable 
in these estimations.  
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Table 1.4.3 Results of static estimation using average profitability of banking industry 
    Baseline X: CAR X: LLP X: SIZE X: LAR 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
    Sample1 Sample2 Sample1 Sample2 Sample1 Sample2 Sample1 Sample2 Sample1 Sample2 
(1) (Z x NI)t -0.057 0.212 0.207 0.255 -0.739 -0.308 0.045 0.328 -0.980 -0.525 
  
(0.828) (0.808) (1.147) (0.883) (0.649) (0.576) (0.863) (0.879) (0.987) (0.777) 
(2) (Z x Xi)t - - 0.075 0.057 0.230 0.125 -0.140 -0.238 (0.066) -0.045 
    
(0.128) (0.0864) (0.161) (0.111) (0.088) (0.202) -0.041 (0.033) 
(3) Zt 1.056* 0.873* -0.592 -0.399 0.473 0.563 1.101* 1.008** 5.722* 4.073* 
  
(0.617) (0.465) (2.903) (2.008) (0.716) (0.529) (0.614) (0.466) (3.008) (2.445) 
(4) Xit - - -0.184 -0.109 -0.577 -0.252 0.258 0.578* 0.181 0.105 
    
(0.319) (0.171) (0.380) (0.191) (0.250) (0.355) (0.117) (0.087) 
Observations 8,674 6,472 8,646 6,444 8,622 6,420 8,674 6,472 8,656 6,454 
R-squared 0.005 0.014 0.013 0.024 0.078 0.075 0.006 0.016 0.030 0.036 
Number of ID 132 100 132 100 132 100 132 100 132 100 
Implied response: 
         (5) NI (1)+(2)+(3) 0.999* 1.085* -0.310 -0.087 -0.036 0.380 1.006* 1.098* 4.676* 3.503 
  
(0.557) (0.652) (1.867) (1.246) (0.364) (0.329) (0.560) (0.661) (2.694) (2.354) 
(6) I (2)+(3) 1.056* 0.873* -0.517 -0.342 0.704 0.687 0.961 0.770* 5.656* 4.029* 
    (0.617) (0.465) (2.777) (1.925) (0.644) (0.487) (0.614) (0.460) (2.969) (2.413) 
Note: Zt is the average profitability of banks in the sample class. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. All estimations include a constant and NI dummy. All standard 
errors of the implied response are calculated using Delta method. Coefficients that are significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5% and 10% level are marked with ***, 
**, and * respectively. Sample1 consists of all banks; Sample2 consists of private banks. 
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1.4.3 Discussion 
The former dynamic estimations in the first part which show that there exist small, but 
statistically significant, differences in profit stability across non-Islamic and Islamic bank in 
the short-run, and the no-difference results of the static estimations in the second part of 
empirical works show that in general there are hardly any difference in profit variability of 
the two types of banks.
 26
 These results indicate that the differences in the dynamic responses 
are not large enough to derive a significant difference in the overall profits variability. 
Nevertheless, estimations that only consider privately-owned non-Islamic banks in Sample2 
show larger and more consistent differences which are even transmitted to the long-run in 
the baseline case, and if we control for bank’s assets size. These results, as also supported by 
the results of simple regression in Table A1.2, imply that the potential difference could be 
better revealed by choosing more comparable banks across the two groups. 
There are several factors behind these empirical results. From the econometrics 
methodology point of view, the convergence-sensitivity of dynamic panel setting explained 
previously may play some role in delivering these results. It could also be derived by the 
sample’s composition in which the total numbers of Islamic banks are relatively too few in 
comparison to non-Islamic banks, so that Islamic banks may not be well represented by the 
data sets which further weaken the statistical power. The other possible explanation is that 
there might be not enough fluctuations in the business cycle to expose the potential 
differences during the period of observation.   
From a banking practice point of view, these results may initiate from the possibility 
that some Islamic banks in Indonesia may try to smooth out the payment to depositors in 
order to sustain their competitiveness and prevent the withdrawal of funds. Thus, changes in 
the assets side may not fully absorbed by the liability side, which is contrary to the original 
concept of an Islamic bank’s inherent stability propounded by Khan and Mirakhor (1987) 
and Askari et al. (2010). The practice of income smoothing is widely known in Islamic 
                                                          
26 For another robustness check, z-score values are calculated using 12-months moving windows of standard 
deviation of profitability. The OLS estimation result on z-score is presented in Table A1.3 in the appendix shows 
no significant difference. 
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banking business (see, among others, Sundararajan (2005) and Farook et al. (2012)). 
Formally, an international standard-setting organisation for Islamic financial service 
providers issues a guidance note for the application of profit equalisation reserve, i.e. a 
reserve created for appropriating a specific amount out of total income before allocating the 
share of income that belongs to the particular Islamic bank (IFSB, 2010). This reserve is 
then used for smoothing the payment to depositors. However, Islamic banks in Indonesia do 
not yet acknowledge this particular reserve. One of the possible ways of smoothing other 
than using a dedicated reserve is by giving banks a share of profits as a bonus to their 
depositors, voluntarily and not included in the deposit contract. The fact that the Islamic 
banking industry in Indonesia is still around 5% of the total market in the dual banking 
system may possibly cause some Islamic banks to retain their payment to depositor as close 
as possible to their non-Islamic counterparts.
 27
 While religious reasons may work as a strong 
factor in keeping individual depositors loyal to their Islamic banks, presumably this may not 
be the case for profit-oriented corporate customers. In short, there is possibility that some 
Islamic banks in Indonesia may not purely apply a profit sharing mechanism in paying their 
depositors, which is otherwise necessary for profit stability. Nevertheless, future research is 
needed to further investigate this income smoothing possibilities.   
 
1.5 Conclusion 
This study empirically tests the theoretical inherent stability of Indonesian Islamic 
banks in comparison to non-Islamic banks in term of banks’ profitability. The profit 
evolution of Islamic and non-Islamic banks in general shows a small but statistically 
significant sensitivity to the evolution of business cycle variable, which is represented by the 
Industrial Production Index in this study. However, we find that Islamic banks’ profitability 
is less sensitive to business cycle fluctuations in the short-run in comparison to non-Islamic 
banks, though also with a fairly limited magnitude. This short-run difference is partly 
                                                          
27 Reports on Islamic banking development in Indonesia show that the share of individual customers deposits 
value to total deposits is decreasing from around 75% in 2008 to around 50% in 2011 onwards (Bank Indonesia, 
2012), though the number of individual customers account is not decreasing. 
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explained by the higher loan-to-asset ratio of Islamic banks in which there is evidence that 
profitability of banks that hold higher loans in their assets portfolio is less sensitive to the 
business cycle. These results are even robust when we construct a sample with more 
comparable banks across types. Nonetheless, overall we could not observe significant 
differences in fluctuations of Islamic and non-Islamic banks profitability.  
One of the implications of this is that, in applying macro-prudential policy, a regulator 
should observe Islamic banks as cautiously as their conventional counterparts. In particular, 
capital to asset ratio as the buffer component in the z-score as the measurement of 
probability of default should be regulates equivalently for both types of banks. 
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Appendix 1 
 
 
Table A1.1 Serial test 
Variables Statistics p-value Average lags 
ROA -11.812 0.000 0.58 
CAR -26.309 0.000 0.36 
LAR -7.379 0.000 0.33 
LLP -1.923 0.027 0.39 
SIZE -1.319 0.093 0.25 
Profits -1.594 0.055 0.61 
Notes: Im, Pesaran and Shin unit-root test where the AR 
parameters are panel specific, panel means are included, and 
time trend is not included. The null is all panels contain unit-
roots. The average lags are chosen by Bayesian Information 
Criteria.  
 
 
 
 
Table A1.2 Estimation on Standard deviation of ROA  
  
Sample1 Sample2 
NI 0.168 0.230* 
 
(0.119) (0.138) 
Constant 0.500*** 0.500*** 
 
(0.092) (0.092) 
Observations 746 557 
R-squared 0.001 0.002 
Notes: OLS estimations on 12-months standard 
deviation of ROA. Clustered standard error in 
parentheses. Coefficients that are significantly different 
from zero at the 1%, 5% and 10% level are marked 
with ***, **, and * respectively.  
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Table A1.3 Estimation on Z-score  
  Sample1 Sample2 
NI -1.853 7.897 
 
(20.439) (21.250) 
CAR 0.936*** 0.746*** 
 
(0.284) (0.257) 
LAR 0.281 0.252 
 
(0.287) (0.348) 
LLP -0.589** -0.671*** 
 
(0.251) (0.245) 
SIZE 1.538 -2.914 
 
(1.456) (2.113) 
Observations 7,087 5,237 
R-squared 0.063 0.058 
Notes: OLS estimations on Z-score based on 12-months rolling 
windows standard deviation of ROA. Clustered standard error in 
parentheses. Coefficients that are significantly different from zero 
at the 1%, 5% and 10% level are marked with ***, **, and * 
respectively. All estimations include a constant term and time 
dummies. 
 
 
Table A1.4 Dynamic baseline estimation on the numerator (Profits) and  
the denominator (Assets) of ROA 
  Y: Annualized Profits   Y: Annualized Profits 
 
(1) (2) 
 
(1) (2) 
  Sample 1 Sample 2   Sample 1 Sample 2 
Yit-1 1.007*** 0.929*** Implied short-run effects 
 
 
(0.0192) (0.034) NI  0.793 0.562** 
(ΔIPI x NI)t 1.047* 0.719* 
 
(0.548) (0.223) 
 
(0.632) (0.425) I -0.254 -0.157 
(ΔIPI x NI)t-1 -0.435 -0.094 
 
(0.306) (0.368) 
 
(0.431) (0.261) Implied long-run effects 
 ΔIPIt -0.254 -0.157 Z x NI -78.909 8.797 
 
(0.306) (0.368) 
 
(109.405) (7.818) 
ΔIPIt-1 -0.097 -0.179 NI -33.610 4.076 
 
(0.182) (0.210) 
 
(99.655) (4.204) 
Observations 8,542 6,356 I 2.338 -4.722 
Number of ID 132 100   (27.65) (6.255) 
ABAR(1) p-value 0.036 0.019   
 
  
ABAR(2) p-value 0.036 0.133 
   Hansen test p-value 0.222 0.127   
 
  
Notes: The values of the annualized profits is in trillions IDR. Clustered one-step and robust two-step 
standard error with small-sample correction in parentheses for Profits and Assets respectively. 
Coefficient that are significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5% and 10% level are marked with ***, 
**, and * respectively. All estimations include NI dummy and a constant. Estimation (1) and (2) use lag 
3-7 and lag 2-25 as instruments respectively. The Hansen test is the test for overidentifying restrictions. 
ABAR(1) and ABAR(2) refer to Arellano-Bond test for autocorrelation of order 1 and 2 respectively, 
with null of no autocorrelation. The standard errors for the implied effects were calculated using the 
Delta method. 
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Chapter 2 How Do Islamic Banks Affect the 
Transmission of Monetary Policy?   
The Case of Indonesia 
 
 
 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Over the last decade, the Islamic banking industry has shown a remarkable growth 
path. Annual assets growth reached 10-15%, a trajectory that is expected to continue in the 
future. The size of the global Islamic financial industry reached USD1.357 trillion in 2012. 
This rapid growth not only exists in countries with a Muslim majority, like Malaysia, 
Indonesia and Middle Eastern countries, but also in countries such as the United Kingdom 
and Japan, where Muslims are in a minority. This growth trend shows the increasing 
presence of Islamic banks in the conventional financial systems, which, with their unique 
characteristics, may well force policy makers at the monetary authority to become 
acquainted with its processes, and, in particular, its implications for the transmission 
mechanism of monetary policy. 
The general principles of Islamic finance could be summarized, but not limited, to the 
following: prohibition of interest, thus encouraging profit and loss sharing; prohibition of 
contractual uncertainty; and prohibition of gambling, speculation or excessive risk-taking in 
undertaking transactions (Askari et al., 2010). Islamic principles also promote a 
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“materiality” aspect, requiring the linking of financing directly with the underlying asset so 
that any “financing activity is clearly and closely identified with the real economy” (Iqbal 
and Mirakhor, 2007), and the real and financial sectors are integrated. Consequently, in 
complying with these principles, some of the readily available financial products may not be 
suitable for the Islamic system. But, on the other hand, due to prohibition on speculative 
transactions, the Islamic system is thought to be more predictable and have closer links to 
the policy objectives, presumably enabling more effective monetary policy by the authority. 
Moreover, the religious motives behind depositors and borrowers of Islamic banks (Khan 
and Khanna, 2012) may curtail any influence of the interest rate shock. All of these 
implications necessitate the need for theoretical and empirical studies around the issue of the 
monetary policy transmission mechanism that works through Islamic banks. 
The traditional channel of monetary policy in the light of the money view emphasises 
the role of changes in interest rates in affecting aggregate demand through consumption, 
saving and investment. For the latter, the direct interest rate channel operates through the 
user cost of capital, widely known as the cost channel (Mishkin, 1995). In a bank-based 
economy, where banks play a main role in the financial industry, this may imply a direct 
effect of lending rates on firms’ marginal production costs.28 Thus, in this set-up, how retail 
rates of the banking industry respond to monetary policy – nowadays, commonly through 
monetary authority setting of a policy rate with money market rates as its intermediate target 
– largely determines the policy effectiveness. There are a number of empirical studies that 
focus on the pass-through of the policy rate or market rates to lending rates, such as 
Cottarelli and Kourelis (1994), Borio and Fritz (1995) and, more recently, Gigineishvili 
(2011) and Illes and Lombardi (2013), on cross-country experiences, and Hofmann and 
Mizen (2001), Weth (2002) and Gambacorta (2008) for individual countries using individual 
bank-level data. On the other hand, financial structures and the development of financial 
markets influence the effectiveness of the particular transmission channel. Moreno (2008) 
                                                          
28 In addition, there is also the credit channel in which the transmission mechanism works by affecting banks’ 
supply of loans rather than the lending rate. Nevertheless, rather than a completely independent channel, 
Bernanke and Gertler (1995) suggests that this channel is an enhancement of the interest rate channel. 
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suggests that in the undeveloped and shallow bond market, the longer-term rate tends to be 
insensitive to the policy rate. In such a market, volatility is considerably high and therefore 
fails to produce reliable signals which would otherwise be necessary in generating 
expectations of future prices (Gigineishvili, 2011). Lack of competition in the banking 
industry, with relatively inelastic loans demand, may further restrain the transmission 
process (Mukherjee and Bhattacharya, 2011).  In addition, there is a tendency for banks in 
countries with less developed financial markets to demand more liquidity (Agenor and 
Aynaoui, 2010), where excessive market liquidity may further weaken the transmission 
(Sorensen and Werner (2006) and Gigineishvili (2010)).  
As for studies in the Islamic banking area, while there are a substantial number of 
studies around products and business developments, there is a lack of empirical and 
theoretical studies regarding the issue of the monetary policy transmission mechanism in 
Islamic banks, in particular in a dual banking system environment where Islamic and 
conventional banks operate side by side. Zaheer et al. (2013) address this matter for 
Pakistan’s case by focusing on the credit view, i.e. the ability of monetary policy to affect 
banks’ loans supply due to market imperfection, and follows Kashyap and Stein (2000) in 
investigating the cross-sectional differences across Islamic and conventional banks. 
Nonetheless, there is no study that focuses on the money view in the dual banking system, 
though in most of the cases, the monetary authority in many jurisdictions are using 
equivalent Sharia-compliant policy instruments when dealing with Islamic banks, thus 
anticipating similar mechanisms.
29
 
This study attempts to bridge the gap by offering a simple theoretical framework to 
explore how a particular transmission mechanism of monetary policy works on Islamic and 
conventional banks within a dual banking system. Specifically, how a certain bank asset 
portfolio, which corresponds to it either being conventional or Islamic, determines the 
equilibrium rate of return on loans and on deposits which, in turn, affects their loans and net-
                                                          
29 Chatta and Halim (2014) conducted a survey on regulator and supervisory agents in countries that offer Islamic 
financial services and found that around 80% have adapted OMOs and primary market issuance of central bank 
or government securities for monetary policy purposes in order to accommodate transactions with Islamic banks. 
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borrowing from the central bank in response to the policy rate. The structure of analysis 
basically follows Champ et al. (2010) in examining the effect of unlimited central bank 
lending to the economy by altering the effective reserve requirement, with some 
modifications to accommodate the particular research question of interest. 
The “materiality” aspect of Islamic finance explained above and the limited 
availability of Sharia-compliant financial products as a result leads to a marked difference in 
Islamic banks assets portfolio which corresponds to a consistently higher loan-to-asset ratio 
in comparison to conventional banks. The chosen theoretical framework of this study 
focuses on this difference in assets portfolio and provides several testable predictions on 
comparison of Islamic and conventional banks’ responses to central bank policy rate, given 
the differences in the loan-to-asset ratio across types. These predictions encompass the 
responses of loans rates as well as deposits rates, bank loans and the net-balance of 
individual banks in the central bank following monetary operations. The main proposition of 
the model suggests more muted effects of Islamic banks in comparison to conventional 
banks due to their larger loan-to-asset ratio. The monetary transmission process works as 
follows: The policy rate set by the central bank affects banks’ retail rates. When there is an 
increase in the policy rate, banks holding more loans in their assets portfolio, which are then 
the Islamic banks, do not need to increase their rate of return on loans as much as banks 
which hold fewer loans in order to satisfy the non-arbitrage condition for the optimal net-
borrowing from the central bank. The smaller increase in interest rate, in turn, affects bank 
loans through demand for loans by firms. Accordingly, banks will adjust their reserves in 
response to these changes in loans such that their borrowing from the central bank will 
decrease, in which the decrease is lower in Islamic banks than conventional banks. As for 
responses of deposit rates, there are no differences in Islamic and conventional banks’ 
responses as long as the non-arbitrage condition is satisfied; it is not dependent on a bank’s 
asset portfolio in this particular set up. These sets of predictions are derived by assuming 
that each agent only deals with agents from the same types, i.e. Islamic banks with Islamic 
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customers, and non-Islamic banks with non-Islamic customers. Any slack of this assumption 
may affect the prediction considerably. 
We test this set of predictions empirically using a panel of individual bank data in the 
Indonesian dual banking system by several sample sets. In accordance to the type-for-type 
assumption on the theoretical framework, we construct sample sets that allow us to analyse 
the implication of this particular assumption. In particular, besides treating all of the 
available Islamic banks data in the economy as one group in the sample, we also use sample 
sets that exclude Islamic windows, i.e. units of non-Islamic bank which offer Islamic bank 
services, so that only Islamic full-fledged banks remain.  
Indonesia is considered a good case because its Islamic banks cover around one-third 
of conventional banks in the number of banks, and they are growing rapidly and 
continuously and increasing in importance. Equally important in regard to the chosen 
theoretical framework, which imposes a symmetrical mechanism of central bank lending and 
deposits facilities, is the considerably large amount of the net-balance of the total domestic 
banking industry at the central bank of Indonesia. This balance, which includes required 
reserves, reached more than 17% with respect to the industry’s total assets in 2007-2012, 
emphasising the relevance of the theoretical model.
30
  
Overall, the results which consider all Islamic banks in one group show no-difference 
responses to monetary policy across non-Islamic and Islamic banks’ rate of return on loans, 
return on deposit, loans and net-borrowing from the central banks. While we predict this 
result to hold for rate of return on deposits, the other theoretical predictions are not 
supported. However, the results change considerably when we use sample sets that exclude 
Islamic windows. The latter supports almost all of the theoretical predictions, except for 
banks’ loans which continue to show no-difference results and exhibit inelastic loans 
demand. These changes demonstrate how the results are highly dependent on how well the 
two types of banks are segregated from each other.  The possibility that both types of banks 
                                                          
30 Though the considerably persistent excess reserve may hamper the monetary policy transmission, study by 
Mukherjee and Bhattacharya (2011) using panel of emerging countries, in which Indonesia took part, finds 
promising results on the effectiveness of monetary policy through traditional interest channel in affecting private 
consumption and private investment.    
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are sharing their customer base generates arbitrage opportunities that drive prices toward 
equality across types, may impede the potential difference of non-Islamic and Islamic banks.    
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly explains the 
monetary policy framework and the development of Islamic banking in Indonesia. Section 3 
outlines the theoretical model. Section 4 presents the data and the corresponding testable 
predictions. Section 5 describes the empirical methodology and presents the empirical 
results. Section 6 concludes with policy implications. 
 
2.2 Monetary Policy Framework and Islamic Banking in Indonesia31 
The Indonesian central bank, Bank Indonesia, started to adopt the inflation targeting 
framework in 2005 by pursuing its goal of maintaining price stability. In so doing, Bank 
Indonesia has the authority to conduct monetary policy by setting the policy rate, BI rate, to 
influence various rates in the money market and in the banking system, which are, in turn, 
expected to ultimately influence output and inflation through various transmission channels.  
At the operational level of the monetary control, Bank Indonesia has several 
instruments at its disposal. The first is open market operations where it directly deals with 
individual banks in the money market through outright purchases or sales of securities 
(government bonds and central bank certificates) to achieve the interbank rate as the 
operational target of monetary policy. The second is standing facilities, where it extends 
lending and deposit facilities with a certain return (BI rate +25 bps and –175 bps for lending 
and deposits facilities respectively) to individual banks. In general, the stated purpose of 
standing facilities is to limit the volatility of the interbank rate in the short-run; however, in 
the longer-run this could also lead to an altering of the effective reserve requirement. The 
third is the statutory reserve requirement in which individual banks are required to keep a 
ratio of their deposits in their giro account at Bank Indonesia. Bank Indonesia takes into 
account these activities, together with government operations and changes in currency 
                                                          
31 Various sources from www.bi.go.id 
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outside the banking system to determine how much liquidity should be made available or be 
absorbed in order to maintain the money market equilibrium that corresponds with the target 
it sets. In addition to these sets of instruments, Bank Indonesia occasionally also directly 
regulates credits or bank loans. 
The sums of banks’ assets portfolios allocated within the central bank, due to 
engaging in the open market operation and utilizing the deposits facility, could reach up to 
20% of total banking assets, which indicates up to around 10% of total assets as excess 
liquidity after the statutory reserve requirements. Figure 2.2.1 shows that the banking 
industry total placements at the central bank are always sufficiently in excess of what is 
mandatory as a reserve requirement,
32
 except for a short period from August to October 
2008, when the impact of global liquidity crises were being felt during that time. These 
excess reserves consist of term deposits in the open market operation and deposits facilities 
with Bank Indonesia.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2.1 Ratio of total balances at the central bank to  
total assets of banking industry (%) 
 
The aforementioned operational activities are conducted through conventional, or 
non-Islamic, as well as Islamic banks in parallel. In dealing with Islamic banks, the central 
                                                          
32 The reserve requirement is determined as ratio of reserve to total deposits. During the period of observations, 
the reserve requirement ratio had changed twice in October 2008 and November 2010. The amount indicated in 
the figure is an approximation for the whole period.   
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bank uses Sharia-compliant instruments which consist of the Sharia-compliant certificate of 
Bank Indonesia, and deposits and financing facilities, all of which aim to work in similar 
ways to guide the market towards the target. Currently, Bank Indonesia uses the same target 
rate on both banking systems.  
Indonesia’s Islamic banking industry has only been operational since 1992, and the 
government continues to encourage its growth by issuing supportive regulations and the 
necessary infrastructure.  As one form of support, they have enacted regulation which allows 
conventional banks to open an Islamic window, a unit that provides Islamic banking 
services. In addition, one can convert a conventional bank in order to establish a new fully-
fledged Islamic bank. During the sample period of this paper, there are many cases of such 
conversions. One direct consequence of this is that, in the last five years, the Indonesian 
Islamic banking industry has experienced rapid annual growth of around 50%. Nevertheless, 
the Islamic banking sector still accounts for a very small proportion of the industry, where 
total assets amount only up to around 5% of the total industry’s assets. 
 
2.3 The Theoretical Framework 
The previous section, which briefly explains Indonesian monetary policy operations, 
indicates that the central bank uses various instruments at its disposal to achieve its target. It 
is also shown in Figure 2.2.1 that the banking industry keeps a considerably large balance 
with the central bank in addition to the required reserves by utilizing the standing facilities 
which constitute lending as well as deposits facility. While the main purpose of the central 
bank lending is to allow banks to meet the statutory reserve requirements without forcing 
them to fire-sell their interest bearing assets when they are unexpectedly experiencing a 
liquidity shortage, it may also be used to affect banks’ loanable funds by acting as an 
alteration of the effective reserve requirement, as in Champ et al. (2011). The reverse may 
also apply to the central bank’s deposits facility, though is not necessarily symmetric. 
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In the following theoretical framework, we will focus on these facilities, i.e. lending 
and deposits facilities that the central bank uses to influence banks’ loanable funds, as 
explained above. The net banks’ balance with the central bank in utilizing these facilities are 
represented as net bank-borrowing from the central bank by imposing the reverse applies 
symmetrically.  The monetary policy transmission in this economy works through the 
exogenous central bank’s policy rate which, in turn, alters various banks’ retail rates and, 
ultimately, banks’ balances at the central banks in order to place loans demands upon them 
at the prevailing lending rate. The household’s portfolio consists of bank deposits and 
government bonds, so that households do not hold currency. In this set up, deposits are the 
only form of money, whereas fiat money is held only as reserves. Banks are assumed to be 
competitive, so that they take all prices as a given, though it is endogenously determined in 
the equilibrium. The structure of the framework allows the transmission mechanism of 
monetary policy to feed through several steps which, in turn, determines the lending rate, 
deposits rate, banks’ loans and the net-borrowing or the balances at the central bank.  
The framework is a modified version of Champ et.al (2011)
33
 and Freixas and Rochet 
(2008)
34
 three-period partial equilibrium model of a closed economy.
35
 It is assumed that 
there is no uncertainty in investment outcomes (no default risk) so that the structure of the 
framework for type I (Islamic) system and type NI (non-Islamic) system are identical and 
could be represented simultaneously by a single framework with an index i  where 
NIIi , .36 However, if we abstract from this particular assumption, Islamic banks’ equity-
based system would be distinct from non-Islamic banks’ debt-based system. The purpose of 
this assumption is to show the potential difference of the two banking systems, even in the 
absence of default risk.  
                                                          
33 The original model by Champ et.al (2010), which builds on the work of Romer (1985) and Freeman (1987), 
employs an overlapping generation in general equilibrium framework for welfare analysis purposes.  
34 In the baseline model of Freixas and Rochet (2008) the role of the bank is solely to provide liquidity insurance 
as consumers can directly access the illiquid technology, while in this modified model households could not 
directly invest in capital. 
35 Indonesia is indeed more precisely represented as a small open economy. However, considering the focus of 
this study, it is simplified to a case of closed economy. 
36 For more accurate terms of Islamic contracts, see Appendix 2.1.  
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There are seven agents in the economy i.e. banks, households, firms, all for each type; 
and a central bank.
37
 It is assumed that each agent only deals with agents of the same type, 
except for the central banks which can deal with both types of banks. This is a very strong 
assumption for an economy with dual banking system since there is no legal restriction that 
limits a bank to deal only with a particular type of consumer and vice versa. There are other 
possibilities of customers-banks relations in such economy. Besides customers having 
relation only with banks of their own type or only with banks from the other type, there may 
also customers who deal with two different types of bank simultaneously. While the first two 
cases are relatively straightforward and create a clear segmentation, the third case is more 
challenging since there could be arbitrage opportunities across types which could impede the 
potential differences. These opportunities are possibly more prevalent in the case of Islamic 
windows or units of non-Islamic bank which offer Islamic bank services, since in this case 
the two types of banks are inter-correlated to each other which may also apply in term of 
their customer base. Therefore, to account for such condition, besides considering all banks 
in the economy, the empirical analyses also deal with sample that excludes Islamic windows 
and only account for fully separated Islamic banks. 
 Households, who are subject to liquidity shocks, can only deal with firms via banks 
which are endowed by their capability in creating capital from consumption good.
38
 The 
particular theoretical framework shows that, due to adherent to Sharia principles, which in 
turn affect depositor liquidity shocks and limit Islamic banks assets portfolios (reflected by 
parameter   and   in the model, respectively), monetary policy that works through central 
bank lending and deposit facilities deliver different outcomes across bank types. 
 
                                                          
37 There is also exists a government who supply government bonds exogenously for each type of agents and use 
the proceeds to finance government expenditure. However, since inclusion of it does not change the result, it is 
not explicitly derived in the model. 
38 Indeed there are various reasons of why an intermediary exists, Bhattacharya and Thakor (1991) provides a 
survey for recent works on financial intermediation. However for simplicity and focus on this paper we restrict 
with the simplest relation. 
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2.3.1 The Environment  
The following framework takes price p  as given and constant so that inflation is 
zero.
39
 For any real value x , X is the nominal value which is equal to px . Table 2.3.1 
describes events in each period. 
Table 2.3.1 Events in each period 
t = 0 
1. Households of each type are endowed by consumption good and invest in bank 
deposits and/or government bonds. 
2. Banks of each type take consumption good from households as deposit; borrow 
from the central bank; transform the consumption good into capital to be borrowed 
by firms. 
t = 1 
1. Households learn their liquidity shocks and if need to consume early they will 
consume their deposit or liquidate their holding of government bonds at some costs. 
2. Banks pay to households which need to consume early by costlessly liquidate their 
holding of government bonds. 
t = 2 
1. Households, which have not done so, consume their deposit in banks. 
2. Banks pay to the rest of the households; get paid from firms; and pay the central 
bank for the borrowing. 
 
2.3.1.1 Households 
Households of each type live for three periods. In the first period, at time 0t  
households are homogenously endowed with 
iy  consumption good, the only good available 
in the economy, but need to consume at time 1t  or 2t . In ex ante terms households are 
identical, besides being type I or NI, however at time 1t  household of each type learn 
whether they will have to consume early (impatient) or late (patient). In the case of 
consuming early their utility is  icu 1 , while for consuming late their utility is  icu 2 , where
jc denotes consumption in time j -th. The utility function is strictly concave and strictly 
increasing in every argument. Households at time 0t   can choose to save by holding 
                                                          
39 We follow Bernanke and Blinder (1988), and more recently Agenor and Aynaoui (2010), in suppressing 
inflation rate so that nominal gross rate of return is equal to real gross rate of return. 
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deposits in banks 
iH  which gives a gross return of iDi 1  or 
i
Di 2  at time 1t  or 2t  
respectively, or by holding two-periods government bonds 
i
HB with gross return of 
i
Gi  at 
time 2t . There exists a secondary market for government bonds which households can 
access with some cost, so that at 1t  the gross return for government bonds is iGi , 
where   is a positive number. All gross returns are greater than one. 
The household’s problem in an ex-ante viewpoint: 
     iiii
cc
cucuUMax
ii 21,
1
21
       (3.1) 
where 
i is the probability of early-consuming and  i1  is of late-consuming, subject to 
the second and third period budget constraints: 
  iHiGiiDii BiHipc 1111         (3.2) 
  iHiGiiDii BiHipc 22221         (3.3) 
where   iHiiHii BHBHpy 2211  ; iii HHH 21  ; iHiHiH BBB 21   and that iH1  
and 
i
HB 1  are respectively withdrawn deposits at 1t  and government bonds that traded in 
the secondary market at 1t , while iH 2 and 
i
HB 2  are withdrawn deposits at 2t  and 
government bonds which are held to maturity.  
Hence in this framework, the difference in utility of I and NI households is only 
captured by the probability of consuming early or late.  
2.3.1.2 Firms 
At time 0t , one unit of capital can be created by banks in a form of business loans 
to firms from every unit of the consumption good that is held as deposits in banks.  Further, 
each 
ik unit of capital, which is acquired in the first period, is used by profit maximizing 
firms to produce )( ikf  units of consumption good in the third period, with diminishing 
marginal product
40
. All capital at the third period is used up in the production process.  
The firm’s problem is to maximize profits as the following: 
   iiLiiF
k
pkrpkf
i
max       (3.4) 
                                                          
40
 This is necessary for the unlimited central bank standing facilities to have a unique equilibrium.   
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            with   0 ikf  and   0 ikf  
where 
i
Lr  is the real gross return of capital which is equal to 
i
Li  the nominal cost of capital 
that have to be paid to banks for each unit of capital.   
Hence, both types of firms are assumed to have identical production function.  
2.3.1.3 Banks 
Banks of each type maximize their profits by issuing deposits  
iH with gross rate of 
return 
i
Di 1  or 
i
Di 2  at time 1t  or 2t  respectively, holding business loans 
iK  and 
government bonds or securities 
i
BB  as their assets with gross rate of return of 
i
Li and 
i
Gi
respectively.
41
 All returns are taken as given for banks, though endogenously determined in 
equilibrium. All securities and loans are default free and have a maturity period of two, i.e. 
assets acquired in the first period will be mature in the third period. It is further assumed that 
each type of bank can only hold assets or liabilities of their own type.
42
 In addition, both 
types of banks are required to hold a certain share of their deposits as reserve requirement   
along the three periods, in a form of fiat money 
iF , which has gross return equal to one. In 
order to meet this reserve requirement, at time 0t  banks are allowed to borrow a fraction 
i of the reserve requirement from the central bank at a determined two-periods gross rate 
of return CBi which exogenously given as the policy rate.
43
 Hence, a negative value of 
i
indicates that banks are actually maintaining positive balances at the central bank in excess 
of reserve requirement.
44
 As this structure works symmetrically, while the rest of the 
description only stated as borrowing from the central bank, the mechanism also encompasses 
                                                          
41 For simplicity it is assumed that securities are consisted by government bonds only so that the terms are used 
interchangeably. 
42 In the actual implementation Islamic banks are indeed restrained from holding assets/liabilities of conventional 
financial products - in Indonesia this is restricted by a formal act (Act of the Republic of Indonesia No. 21 of 
2008 Concerning Sharia/Islamic Banking) – but not vice versa. In particular, though conventional banks cannot 
offer Islamic financial products, but they may hold Islamic securities. However, for simplicity we assume 
complete separation. 
43 In dealing with Islamic banks, sharia-compliant contract is used. In the case of Indonesia, the central bank use 
profit-loss sharing contract, mudharaba, where the sharing ratio is set equivalently to meet the policy rate. 
44 In real practice, there is a spread in the rate of return of lending (borrowing) and deposits (placement) facility 
to the policy rate, see Section 2.2. 
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placement or deposits at the central bank.
45
 For simplicity, banks are assumed to have 
zero net worth.46 The balance sheet of a bank would look as in Table 2.3.2.  
Table 2.3.2 Balance sheet of a type i  bank  
Assets Liabilities 
Reserves                                                  iH  Deposits                                                  iH  
Business loans                    iii H  11  Borrowing from central bank           ii H  
Securities                      iii H  111  Net worth                                                   0 
Total                                               ii H1  Total                                            ii H1  
 
Loans gross returns exceed gross returns on securities, and the latter in turn exceed the 
unity gross return on fiat money. However, it is assumed that a secondary market is only 
available for securities but not for loans so that loans acquisitions and disposals could be 
executed only at the beginning of the first period. In addition, unlike households, banks 
could perfectly access the secondary market at no cost. The percentage of banks assets aside 
from reserve requirement that is invested in loans or capital is 
i . Further, banks at time 
0t  are assumed to perfectly anticipate early withdrawals of the liquidity pool at time 
1t , or in other words banks could perfectly observe probability i  and there exist 
mechanisms which ensure no coordination failure so that the patient household always wait 
for time 2t .  
The bank’s problem is to choose the amount of deposits it is willing to undertake and 
the amount of borrowing from the central bank in order to maximize the three-period profits 
as in the following: 
           iiDiiDiCBiiGiiLiiiB
H
pHiiiii
ii 21,
111max 

 (3.5) 
subject to 
ii
B
ii HBKF            (3.6) 
 ii   1            (3.7) 
                                                          
45 This is somewhat different from Agenor and Aynaoui (2010) who considers asymmetric effect of excess 
liquidity, which in their model is defined as involuntary excess reserves of cash in vault. 
46 As we will see later, the assumption of no default on loans and securities and banks’ ability to offer optimal 
deposit contract in which liquidity shocks are perfectly diversifiable entails no bank capital or equity is needed. 
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The objective function (3.5) is linear in 
iH so that the size of each individual bank is 
indeterminate so that bank decisions do not affected by their size and that bank makes zero 
profits in equilibrium. The first term inside the bracket of the RHS is the return earned from 
investing in loans and bonds, the second term is the return from holding reserves net any 
cost for borrowed reserves, and the last is the cost from issuing deposits that must be paid to 
households as depositors. Constraint (3.6) is the balance of bank balance sheet. Constraint 
(3.7) is the maturity-match condition which allows banks to perfectly diversify liquidity 
shocks. In this framework, parameter 
i and i  are the source of differences between type 
I and NI .
47
  
2.3.1.4 The Central Bank 
The central bank fully elastically supplies two-period central bank loans (deposits), as 
banks’ borrowed (excess) reserves at the determined policy rate to both types of banks, and 
non-borrowed reserves of fiat money 
iM .48 In this theoretical framework, since the purpose 
is solely to analyse the effect of policy rate to both types of banks, there is no explicit policy 
rule of the central bank so that the policy rate is determined exogenously. 
 
2.3.2 The Equilibrium 
From the household’s problem, in order for households to be indifferent of holding 
both types of assets, the two must give the same gross rate of return, so that: 
  iG
i
D ii 1         (3.8) 
 
i
G
i
D ii 2         (3.9) 
At the rate of return in (3.8) and (3.9), the optimal allocation that satisfies the first 
order condition:  
    *22*11 iiDiiD cuicui         (3.10) 
                                                          
47 Later on for the testable predictions, 
i is calibrated from the data. 
48 Because nominal deposits are the only form of money, fiat money is held only as reserves. Following the 
original model of Champ et al. (2011) the borrowing from the central bank acts as an alteration of the effective 
reserve requirement, rather than as short-term liquidity purposes. 
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Equation (3.10) show that the relative return of deposits at times 2 and 1 equates the 
marginal rate of substitution between consumption at dates 2 and 1. 
From the firm’s optimal condition we have marginal product of capital equates the 
cost of capital: 
     iLi rkf          (3.11) 
Equation (3.11) is the firms’ demand curve for bank loans which is decreasing in the 
rate of return on loans, so that an increase in rate of return on loans will reduce the demand 
for loans. 
The first order condition in the bank’s problem with respect to 
iH  is the banks’ zero 
profit condition: 
          0111 21  iDiiDiCBiiGiiLii iiiii   (3.12) 
Equation (3.12) ensures that banks have zero profit in equilibrium. 
From the first order condition of the bank’s problem with respect to 
i we have the 
non-arbitrage condition for optimal borrowing from the central bank: 
   iGiiLiCB iii   1        (3.13) 
This condition implies that banks would be willing to borrow from the central bank as 
long as the cost of borrowing is not greater than the weighted return that banks received 
from placing the proceed in their investment portfolio, i.e. in loans and bonds. The zero 
profit condition implies that these costs and returns are equalized. This intuition applies in 
the case of positive 
i . For a negative value,  (3.13) implies that for banks to be willing to 
place a fraction of their loanable fund in the central bank, the return from this placement is 
not lower than the weighted return of their portfolio in loans and bonds. Likewise, as banks 
make zero profit in equilibrium, these terms are equalized. 
Substituting the maturity-match constraint (3.7), non-arbitrage condition (3.13) in to 
(3.12) we have redefined the gross return equalities in (3.8) and (3.9) to the following: 
  11  iGiGiGiD iiii        (3.14) 
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  12  iLiLiGiD iiii        (3.15) 
From (3.14) and (3.15) we can see that part of return from government bonds and 
loans are foregone for holding reserve requirement in fiat money which gives zero return, or 
gross rate of return equal to one. To make households indifferent between holding 
government bonds and deposits, the cost in entering the secondary market for households 
equalize banks’ foregone return for holding fiat money. Thus, in this set up the role of banks 
is simply to make capital accessible for households.  
To close the framework’s model we need market clearing conditions for deposits, 
business loans, government bonds and fiat money as the following.
49
 From the optimal 
allocation of the household problem in (3.10) we have the supply of deposit which is taken 
as given by bank which in turn invests it in various forms of assets as in (3.6). The market 
clearing for deposits is: 
 
i
B
iiii
H
i BKFHBpy       (3.16) 
where the term on the LHS of 
iH is the amount of households’ endowment that is 
invested as deposits and the term in the RHS is the balance of bank balance sheet as (3.6). 
From the firms’ optimal condition in (3.11) and rearranging terms we have the 
demand for business loans and the supply of loans from banks problem which satisfies 
balance of banks’ balance sheet condition (3.6) and the maturity-match condition in (3.7): 
   iiiiLi pHrpk )1(        (3.17) 
 where  .ik  is a diminishing decreasing function. 
The supply of government bonds is exogenous and equals the demand for it by 
households and banks of each type: 
 
i
B
i
H
i BBB          (3.18) 
Finally, the central bank elastically supplies total fiat money for borrowed and non-
borrowed reserves which is demanded by both types of banks:  
                                                          
49 We also need the government budget constraint in order to clear the market of consumption goods or to obtain 
the feasible sets, see footnote 37. For derivation of the government budget constraint see Appendix 2.2. 
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  
i
i
i
ii
i
i MHF        (3.19) 
The LHS of (3.19) is the total demand for fiat money, which in this case is equal to 
 iH , the total demand for reserves. The RHS of (3.19) is the total supply of fiat money 
where the first term is the borrowed reserves and the second term is the stock of fiat money 
as non-borrowed reserves. Hence, the market clearing for money in (3.19) is automatically 
satisfied if the other market clearing conditions in (3.16), (3.17) and (3.18) are satisfied since 
money is the numeraire.  
 
2.3.3 Transmission Mechanism of Monetary Policy  
For simplicity, the analysis of the transmission mechanism of monetary policy is 
restricted to an equilibrium in which households put all of their endowment as bank deposits. 
Any other interior equilibrium would not change the general results.
50
 The transmission 
mechanism of the monetary policy in this model works in the following sequence:
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1. The central bank determines the policy rate CBi . 
2. This drives other assets returns to adjust: 
a) Rate of return of business loans is determined from gross return equality 
in (3.15) and non-arbitrage condition (3.13) given the CBi from Step 1: 
 
 i
i
CBi
L
i
i





11
1
      (3.20) 
b) Rate of return of government bonds is determined from the rate of return 
equality condition in (3.15) at the prevailing 
i
Li  from (3.20). 
c) The weighted average rate of return of deposits   iDiiDiiD iii 211    
where 
i
Di 1  is the return of early withdrawal at 1t  and 
i
Di 2  is the return 
of deposits is at 2t , is determined for a given  ii   1  at the 
prevailing 
i
Li  and 
i
Gi . 
                                                          
50 We rule out the case of the other corner of non-deposits equilibrium since in that particular case banks would 
not exist. 
51 These steps resemble, though in a more simplistic manner, the transmission mechanism suggested by Goodhart 
(2002) which shows that bank reserves is actually determined in the end of the transmission. 
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3. Firms determine the volume of business loans they wish to undertake through 
demand for business loans as in the LHS of (3.17) at the prevailing 
i
Li . 
4. Given the demand for business loans from Step 3 and the corresponding level of 
deposits with the supply of loans in (3.17), banks determine how much fraction 
of the reserve to be borrowed from the central bank:  
   
ii
iii
L
i
i
py
pyrpk





1
     (3.21) 
Equation (3.21) is key for this particular transmission mechanism of interest, because 
it reflects how the policy rate ultimately determines the ratio of borrowed reserve 
requirement, or in other words banks’ utilization of central bank standing facilities, through 
the above sequence. 
 
2.3.4 Comparative Statics  
Before deriving the comparative statics of the effect of monetary policy, we make some 
predictions on the level of banks’ rate for a given banks portfolio 
i . By taking the first 
derivative of the derived equilibrium conditions in the previous section with respect to 
i  
we can predict that banks with larger 
i have lower iLi  as long as the net CBi  is positive. 
The intuition is that banks which hold higher ratio of loans in their asset portfolio do not 
need their lending rates to be as high as banks with lower ratio of loans in order to meet the 
non-arbitrage condition in (3.13). For the weighted average rate of return on deposits, 
i
Di , it 
is not affected by banks’ assets portfolio. As long as (3.13) is satisfied, any portfolio entails 
equal 
i
Di  for a given CBi . The demand for bank loans is not directly affected by 
i but it is 
affected through the lending rate 
i
Li . Since non-Islamic banks have higher 
i
Li , thus for the 
same demand function their loans will be less than Islamic banks’. The net-borrowing from 
the central bank 
i will be higher for a higher i . As banks with higher i charge lower iLi
and in turn have higher loans, they will also need to borrow more from the central bank in 
order to meet the demand for loans upon them.  
55 
 
In the next analysis, we derive how increase in CBi  affect the endogenous variable as 
given in Step 2 to Step 4 of the transmission mechanism of monetary policy for a given 
banks portfolio 
i . The following predictions outline the response of banks given their 
different assets portfolio.    
 
Prediction on rate of return on loans 
Increase in policy rate leads to an increase in rate of return on loans in which the type of 
banks that have larger loan-to-asset ratio will experience a smaller increase. 
From (3.20) we have that: 
 
0
11
1





i
CB
i
L
i
i

       (3.22) 
The increase in CBi will increase 
i
Li  more than proportionately, in order to satisfied the 
non-arbitrage condition in (3.13), because some part of the rate of return on loans are 
foregone for holding the required reserves. The higher the required reserves  , the higher is 
the increase in 
i
Li  implying the more banks need to be compensated for the foregone returns. 
For the responses to changes in CBi with respect to value of
i : 
 
0
1
2















i
CB
i
L
i i
i



     (3.23) 
Banks which hold more loans in their assets portfolio do not need to increase their rate 
of return on loans as much as banks which hold fewer loans in order to satisfy the non-
arbitrage condition. 
Prediction on rate of return on deposits 
Increase in policy rate leads to an increase in the weighted average rate of return on 
deposits which is independent to the value of loan-to-asset ratio. 
From (14) and (15) and the average rate of return on deposits 
  iDiiDiiD iii 211   : 
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 (3.24) 
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The increase in CBi will increase 
i
Di  less than proportionately, implying incomplete 
pass-through, because not all of the deposits can be invested due to reserved requirement. 
According to (3.24), higher   would dampen the pass-through. 
For the responses to changes in CBi with respect to value of
i : 
 0











CB
i
D
i i
i

       (3.25) 
Equation (3.25) implies that as long as the non-arbitrage condition is satisfied, the 
average rate of return on deposits is independent to banks assets portfolio. 
   
Prediction on bank loans 
Increase in policy rate leads to a decrease in loans in which type of banks that have larger 
loan-to-asset ratio will experience a smaller decrease. 
Given the assumption that the firms technology  ikf  are the same across type, then 
the demand curve for loans  iLrk  are also the same across type. From Prediction 1, since  iLi  
is increasing with CBi  where 
i
L
i
L ri  , so that: 
 0
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





CB
i
L
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CB
i
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i
r
k
i
k
       (3.26) 
As shown in (3.22) that the increase in CBi will increase 
i
Li  so that the loans provided 
will decrease because demand for loans is decreasing in 
i
Li as in (3.11).  
For the responses to changes in CBi with respect to value of
i :  
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.0    (3.27) 
The first term in the RHS of (3.27) is zero since firms demand for loans do not depend 
on banks’ asset portfolio, 
i . This implies that any difference in ik would be brought by 
differences in 
i
Li across the two types of banks. The second term in the RHS implies that 
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since the increase in 
i
Li of bank with larger 
i is smaller, then the decrease in ik will be 
smaller in comparison to banks with lower
i . 
 
Prediction on net-borrowing from the central bank 
Increase in policy rate leads to a decrease in net-borrowing from central bank in which the 
type of banks that have larger loan-to-asset ratio will experience a smaller decrease.  
From (3.21) together with Prediction 2 and Prediction 3 where 
i
L
i
L ri  , we have that: 
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   (3.28) 
Increase in  CBi will increase 
i
Li  which will further reduce 
ik . The effect of ik on i
is positive so that increase in CBi  will ultimately reduce 
i . This effect is inversely related 
to   and i  as shown in the first term of the RHS. The intuition is somewhat straight 
forward, i.e. the higher is the value of these two parameter, the less is the ratio of borrowed 
reserve requirement 
i , that need to be borrowed from the central bank for a given level of 
bank loans.  
For the responses to changes in CBi with respect to value of
i : 
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  (3.29) 
Banks with larger 
i will decrease their borrowing from central bank less than banks 
with smaller 
i , because they still need more funds to service their loans which is 
experiencing a smaller drop in comparison to banks with lower 
i as shown in the previous 
Prediction 3. 
In general, the framework predicts that monetary policy that works through this 
particular channel will be more effective on banks that have lower 
i . 
 
58 
 
2.4 Data and Testable Predictions 
2.4.1 Data 
The data source is the monthly bank reports to the central bank of Indonesia (Bank 
Indonesia, 2007-2012b) which is an obligatory report for every bank. Generally, the period 
covered is from January 2007 to October 2012, except for rate of return on deposits and rate 
of return on loans the starting period is from January 2008. The sample considers 160 
commercial banks, of which 121 are non-Islamic banks, 11 are full-fledged Islamic banks, 
and 28 are Islamic windows or units of non-Islamic bank which offer Islamic bank services. 
This data set comprehensively includes all commercial banks which are operating in the 
period of observations. The sample of non-Islamic banks includes government banks, 
regional development banks and private banks, while the full-fledged Islamic banks are all 
private banks. The Islamic windows includes unit of government banks, regional 
development banks and private banks. For cases of mergers and acquisition, the newly 
formed bank has the same identity number as the main bank. For cases of conversions, the 
same number of identity is used but with a different value in the NI dummy variable. In 
order to account for some adjustments that correspond with conversion case, we adjust the 
sample by excluding several months after each conversion to allow for the newly converted 
bank to have new customer base. The panel is unbalanced, since there are some bank 
closures during the period of observations.  
The policy rate, or a measure of stance of monetary policy, is the announced central 
bank rate or BI-rate, which is agreed at Board of Governor monthly meetings. Figure 2.4.1 
shows that the policy rate is actually decreasing over time. This condition does not alter the 
results, since difference-in-differences estimation assumes a symmetrical response.
52
 We 
consider a cut-off level of 6.5%, in which a policy rate above this level is considered as high, 
or a cut-off period of August 2009.
53
 This cut-off point is based on the consideration that it is 
the start of the new Board of Governors, which was implementing an accommodative (lower 
                                                          
52 Alternatively, we could put negative sign for the treatment. 
53 There was a slight increase of 25 bps in the policy rate during the period of February to September 2011. 
However, the results were generally consistent. 
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policy rate) and relatively passive (less volatile) monetary policy during the rest of the 
observation periods. This cut-off level is also supported by a significant breakpoint test 
during the same particular period.
54
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.4.1 Bank Indonesia policy rate (BI rate in %) 
Source: Bank Indonesia Statistics, www.bi.go.id 
 
For banks’ individual characteristics, we include equity, cash holdings, interbank 
placements and liabilities, and loss provisions as control variables. The equity data for 
Islamic window banks is the net- inter-branch balance between the Islamic unit and its main 
non-Islamic office. The data for loans of non-Islamic banks is the total loans that include 
working capital, consumption loans and investment or business loans. As for Islamic banks, 
the total loans variable includes all the available financing contracts that consist of leasing, 
trade financing, partnership, etc.
55
 The data for rate of return on loans of non-Islamic banks 
is the weighted average of interest rates on the three types of loans, while the Islamic banks 
include the percentage of received shared-profits and the percentage of a fixed-margin.
56
   
The data for return on the deposits of non-Islamic banks are weighted average interest rates 
on current accounts, saving accounts and time deposits, while for Islamic banks it is the 
weighted average of the percentage of the realised or actual shared-profit to savings accounts 
and time deposits, which is calculated ex-post by individual Islamic banks, and the 
                                                          
54 A Chow breakpoint test is conducted on time series estimation on total loans of both types of banks with the 
policy rate. 
55 Hasan and Lewis (2007) provides excellent survey on Islamic banking products and operations. 
56 Though in principles the main characteristic of Islamic financial contract is profit- and-loss sharing contract, 
there are also mark-up based contracts which are usually used for trade and lease activities. 
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percentage of voluntary return (grants) that is given on current accounts. To generate the 
series for the net-borrowing from the central bank, the data of placements at Bank Indonesia 
is deducted from the liabilities to Bank Indonesia for each individual bank. These 
placements include balances at the giro account and any balance in the deposits facility, 
whereas the liabilities include the lending facility from Bank Indonesia and other liabilities. 
The summary statistics are outlined in Table 2.4.1. 
Table 2.4.1 shows that the average data of rate of return on loans, Rloans, supports the 
framework’s static prediction where the average for all Islamic is 13.29% slightly lower than 
the one of non-Islamic banks at the mean of 13.96%. However, if we exclude Islamic 
windows the reverse is true where the average Rloans of full-fledged Islamic banks reaches 
16.17%. This could be a sign that full-fledge Islamic banks may have higher intermediary 
cost than Islamic windows. The possibilities that the latter may have been enjoying 
informational advantages provided by their non-Islamic main office in terms of loans 
screening, for the case of common debtors, could be one of the factor that contributes to the 
lower intermediary cost of Islamic windows in comparison to the full-fledged Islamic banks.   
However, the data shows that on average Islamic banks, both full-fledged and windows, are 
paying higher return to their depositors, Rdep, in comparison to non-Islamic banks in general 
whereas the framework predicts equal deposit rates. For the level of loans in log values, 
Lloans, the average of full-fledge Islamic banks is slightly higher than non-Islamic banks 
despite that they charge higher Rloans. This could be an indication that their borrowers are 
different and may have religious motive as in Khan and Khanna (2012). As for the net-
borrowing from the central bank, NCB, in support with the static prediction, Islamic banks 
borrowed more funds from (or placed less funds in) the central bank. The negative value for 
net-borrowing from the central banks indicates that most of the banks are actually a net-
lender to the central banks, i.e. they have placement in the central bank in addition to the 
required reserve ratio in which these extra positions are entitled to a certain return tied-up to 
the policy rate as explained previously.  
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Table 2.4.1 Summary Statistics 
Dependant 
variables 
Non-Islamic banks Islamic banks 
All Private
a)
 All Full-fledged
b)
 
Mean
c)
  Stdev Mean
d)
  Stdev Mean  Stdev Mean  Stdev 
Rdep 5.88
***/***
 2.07 6.33 2.11 7.67 6.81 6.23 2.62 
Rloans 13.96
***/***
 4.04 14.08
***
 4.59 13.29 4.98 16.17 4.51 
Lloans 6.37
***/
 0.88 6.24
***
 0.91 5.55 1.10 6.41 0.74 
NCB -21.96
***/***
 14.39 -21.29
***
 14.31 -12.51 14.72 -14.33 9.05 
Control 
variables     
    
    
    
CAR 17.09
***/
 19.46 19.91 21.98 36.16 23.71 18.69 15.58 
KAR 1.81
***/***
 1.75 1.13 0.92 1.12 2.45 1.11 0.81 
NIB 3.32
***/***
 13.09 1.79
***
 13.69 10.96 21.31 -2.71 8.01 
LLP 1.89 3.95 1.96 4.56 1.89 2.65 1.83 1.20 
Lequity 5.81
***/**
 0.73 5.73 0.73 5.06 1.09 5.73 0.37 
Lcash 4.66
***/***
 0.99 4.36
**
 0.90 3.56 0.97 4.45 0.88 
Lsecurities 3.91
***/***
 2.60 3.82
***
 2.57 2.25 2.49 4.65 1.75 
Lintbanka 5.29
***/***
 1.17 5.08
***
 1.21 4.16 1.52 4.75 0.97 
Lintbankp 4.75
***/***
 1.63 4.67
***
 1.72 3.23 2.04 4.98 1.11 
Others                 
LAR 56.48
***/***
 16.85 57.56
***
 17.66 87.80 34.65 81.66 24.49 
TDD 56.20
/***
 24.01 65.75
***
 18.90 55.60 23.28 70.02 16.92 
Assets 22044 57464 13059 23527 2531 6286 9270 11498 
Descriptions                 
Rdep Rate of return on deposits (%) 
    Rloans Rate of return on loans (%) 
     NCB Net borrowing from the CB to total assets (%) 
 CAR Equity to total assets (%) 
    KAR Cash to total assets (%) 
    NIB Net-interbank to total assets (%) 
   LLP Loss provisions to total assets (%) 
   Lintbanka Interbank placement (log) 
    Lintbankp Interbank liabilities (log) 
    LAR Loans to total assets (%) 
    TDD Time deposits to total deposits (%) 
   Assets in billions IDR 
      Notes: a) Excludes government and regional banks. 
            b) Excludes Islamic windows (Islamic full-fledged banks are all privately-owned banks).  
            c) Mean test of All Non-Islamic banks to All Islamic/Full-fledged banks. 
            d) Mean test of Private Non-Islamic banks to Islamic Full-fledged banks  
            The difference between mean value of Non-Islamic and Islamic banks that is significant at 1%, 5% 
             and 10% are marked with ***, **, and * respectively. 
            Lx is x (billions IDR) in log values. 
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The next large difference is shown by loan-to-asset ratio, LAR, where Islamic banks’ 
average value reaches 87.8% and 81.66% for samples that includes and excludes Islamic 
windows respectively, significantly higher than 56.48% and 57.56% for the average of all 
and privately-owned non-Islamic ones, respectively. We will return to this observed 
difference below. The largest difference between overall non-Islamic and Islamic banks is 
the ratio of net-interbank to total assets (3.32% and 10.96% for all non-Islamic and all 
Islamic banks, respectively). Nevertheless, though NIB of all Islamic banks is more than 
double all non-Islamic banks’, we could not directly imply that there is a consistent 
difference in this variable since the value is changing considerably if we exclude Islamic 
windows from the sample and only consider Islamic full-fledged banks. On the other hand, 
the average of variable LAR seems to be reflecting a more consistent difference of the two 
types of banks across sample-sets.  
The large difference of LAR between non-Islamic and Islamic banks is due to several 
factors that relate to the Islamic finance principle and, in turn, to the Indonesian Islamic 
banking condition.
57
 First, due to Islamic finance principles, Islamic banks’ treasury units do 
not have extensive involvement in money as well as assets markets. Their activity is limited 
to supporting the basic liquidity requirement rather than speculative motive. Second, there 
are very limited Sharia-compliant securities available, even though a high demand exists. 
This is due to problems in originating Sharia-compliant securities, which are related to 
issues such as assets re-tradability and pricing.
58
  
One particularly interesting aspect of LAR is that banks’ liquidity conditions are 
sometimes associated with their size, where smaller banks tend to be more liquid (Kashyap 
and Stein, 1994).
59
 However, here we find that Islamic banks, full-fledged and windows, 
                                                          
57 These phenomena are not solely endured by Indonesian Islamic banking sector but also in other jurisdictions. 
According to the IFSB (Islamic Financial Service Board) publication on Guiding Principles of Liquidity Risk 
Management in March 2012, the arduous of liquidity risk management of Islamic banks is ubiquitous and the 
potential for cross-border or regional management of liquidity risk is even harder to achieve due to varying views 
on Sharia compliance and lack of securitisable assets for benchmark issues.  
58 According to some interpretation of Sharia law, Islamic securities shall be used for purely investment motive 
so that it shall be held to maturity or for a minimum fixed period and it is only can be traded for its face value. 
Nevertheless, there exist diverging Sharia views across jurisdiction.  
59 The liquidity condition is measured as ratio of securities to total assets or the opposite of our model definition 
of LAR. 
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exhibit higher LAR irrespective of their size, i.e. they have higher LAR in comparison to their 
non-Islamic counterparts of a similar size. In addition, this observed difference is consistent 
across time, i.e. Islamic banks always exhibit higher LAR than non-Islamic banks during 
observation periods, as in Figure 2.4.2. Hence, LAR could be a good candidate to calibrate 
the theoretical framework in distinguishing between the two types of banks. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.4.2 Sample-averages Loan-to-Asset ratio (%) 
 
If we refer back to the theoretical framework in Section 2.2.3, this LAR data 
corresponds to parameter 
i  which in turn reflects the probability of late-consuming 
households  i1  by the maturity-match constraint. In the equilibrium where efficient 
allocation is reached, these two terms should be identical; otherwise the liquidity risks would 
persist. In actual banking operations, maturity mismatch is ubiquitous requiring certain 
capital buffers and some extension of liquidity reserves. Indeed, Table 2.4.1 shows that in 
general Islamic banks do maintain higher capital-to-asset ratio in comparison with the non-
Islamic banks, which are 36.16% and 17.09% for all Islamic banks and all non-Islamic 
banks respectively. However, if we look at the sub-sample of full-fledged Islamic banks the 
difference is no longer significant, which implies that the Islamic windows are the ones who 
actually maintain higher CAR. 
On the other hand from the depositors’ viewpoint, theoretically, Islamic finance 
principles shall also hold for households of Islamic type. This condition entails a larger share 
of late-consuming households in comparison to non-Islamic type since financial investment 
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should be based on a real investment motive which requires households to hold their 
financial investment to maturity, as similarly suggested by Khan and Khanna (2012). In the 
theoretical framework the probability of patient households  i1  can be approximated by 
the ratio of time deposits to total deposits at the banks, TDD. Interestingly, the data show 
that on average, Islamic and non-Islamic banks have fairly similar values of TDD, which are 
55.6% and 56.19% respectively, if we considers all banks of both types. However, when we 
exclude Islamic windows, the average TDD of non-Islamic banks is now significantly lower 
than those of Islamic full-fledged banks which reach an average of 70.02%. The same is 
hold true if we only consider privately-owned non-Islamic banks, with the average TDD of 
65.75%. Thus, this condition together with the data for average CAR, imply that separating 
Islamic windows and Islamic full-fledged banks is important for our analyses. Therefore we 
consider sub-samples of Islamic banks in the empirical works as described later.  
Though TDD is important, there are still some possibilities of early withdrawal of 
time deposits, which does not make it a good approximation for the probability of hold to 
maturity or patient households  i1 . Moreover, TDD is not a banks’ decision or choice 
that could represent their individual characteristics. Thus, based on this and referring to the 
previous paragraph, for the empirical exercise we directly employ individual banks’ 
portfolio data LAR to calibrate parameter 
i  in deriving the testable predictions of the next 
section. 
 
2.4.2 Testable Predictions 
The theoretical framework suggests four testable predictions for the responses of 
banks following an increase in the policy rate or the central bank lending rate. Further, in 
testable predictions for the comparison of non-Islamic and Islamic banks responses, we 
focus our comparison in accordance with the different assets portfolio composition across 
the two types of banks which are reflected by the different values of parameter 
i in the 
theoretical framework.  Based on the summary statistics in Table 2.4.1, we set the value of 
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this parameter to be greater for Islamic banks in comparison to those of non-Islamic banks, 
i.e. 
I > NI . According to this set up, the following testable predictions are derived:  
Prediction1. Increase in the policy rate will increase non-Islamic banks’ rate of return 
on loans more than those of Islamic banks. 
Prediction2. Increase in the policy rate will increase Islamic and non-Islamic banks’ 
rate of return on deposits with no significant difference. 
Prediction3. Increase in the policy rate will decrease non-Islamic banks’ loans more 
than those of Islamic banks. 
Prediction4. Increase in the policy rate will decrease (increase) non-Islamic banks’ 
borrowing from (lending to) the central banks more than those of Islamic 
banks. 
 
2.5 Empirical Works 
2.5.1 Empirical Model 
As a baseline econometric model, we apply a standard difference-in-difference 
strategy as in Card and Krueger (1994) on testing the testable predictions using the 
following difference-in-differences (DD) regression: 
 
ijtijttjtjijt XdNIdNIY   ..    (5.1) 
where ijtY  is the various variable of interest as in the testable predictions, i.e. rate of return 
on deposits and on loans in percentage values, the level of loans in log values, and the ratio 
of net-borrowing from the central bank to total assets in percentage value of bank i  from 
group j , i.e. Islamic or non-Islamic, at time t ; jNI  is the group dummy for non-Islamic 
banks; td is the treatment dummy; ijtX  is the matrix of banks characteristics which serve as 
control and explanatory variables; and ijt  is the disturbance where ijtiijt vu  , with iu
∼IID  2,0 u  the unobserved bank-specific effect independent of ijtv , the idiosyncratic error 
that may have bank-specific patterns of heterokedasticity and serial correlation but 
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uncorrelated across banks. The treatment dummy has a value of one if the policy rate (i.e. 
BI-rate) is higher than a cut-off level that is considered as high, as explained in the data 
section and zero otherwise.
60,61
  
In accordance with the theoretical framework in hand, the empirical model 
specifications exhibit static relationships of the policy rate to various dependent variables of 
interest. Though the static model has potential advantages by being more parsimonious 
compared with the dynamic model (Verbeek, 2012), the interest rate variables and the log of 
loans are trended series with autocorrelation so that using a static model would result in 
inefficiency on the standard errors, and even spurious regression. To deal with the 
inefficiency problem, we cluster the standard error in individual level as suggested by 
Bertrand et al. (2004), particularly for the difference-in-difference estimator. By clustering 
in this way, the standard errors are robust from a possible heteroskedasticity pattern and 
autocorrelation within individual. Further, to ensure that the regressions are not spurious, we 
must check for co-integration and find that the non-stationary variables in each particular 
regression are co-integrated, implying that long-run relationships exist between them (Tables 
A1 and A2 in Appendix 2.3).  
The main parameter of interest,  , captures the DD effects of the treatment, which in 
this case is the higher policy rate. Any difference in the response of Islamic and non-Islamic 
banks is captured by this specific parameter. In particular the expected sign of the estimated 
parameter ˆ  is positive for rate of return on loans as in Prediction 1 and negative for loans 
and borrowing from the central bank as in Predictions 3 and 4 respectively, while for rate of 
return on deposits we expect ˆ  not to be significant as in Prediction 2. Parameter   
captures the non-Islamic banks group fixed effect, and parameter  captures the specific 
time effect when the treatment is applied. The latter, or the sum of it with parameter   in 
the case of type NI, provides predictions for the direction of the treatment effect in the 
testable predictions, which are positive for both rate of return on deposits and on loans, as in 
                                                          
60 See Figure 2.4.1 which shows that the policy rate is actually decreasing over time. This does not alter the 
results since difference-in-differences estimation assumes symmetrical response. 
61 Further, the level of policy rate itself is used in place of the treatment dummy. Thus   captures the differences 
on the response of non-Islamic and Islamic banks to the policy rate.  
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Prediction 1 and 2 respectively, and negative for loans and borrowing from the central bank, 
as in Prediction 3 and 4 respectively. However, this specification limits other possible 
common or macro factors that may affect the dependent variable. To overcome this problem, 
as the next step, monthly-fixed effects t  are used instead so that the econometric model 
takes the following form: 
   ijtijttjtjijt XNIdNIY   .    (5.2) 
The identification of these set-ups is based on the assumption of common trend across 
non-Islamic and Islamic banks, so that the unobserved factors are fixed over time and across 
the two bank-groups. However, as Islamic banks are a relatively new industry in comparison 
to non-Islamic ones, they might experience higher growth in their business. In response to 
such a concern, we allow for each group to follow a different time trend, as in the following: 
   ijtijttjjtjijt XTTNINIdNIY   210 ..  (5.3) 
where 0  captures non-Islamic banks group-specific intercept, as before, 1 and 2  capture 
the non-Islamic and Islamic banks group-specific trends respectively. Based on this 
specification, the identification of the response to the policy rate comes from whether such 
changes lead to deviations from pre-existing group-specific trends. 
We also do another robustness check of the results with respect to the selected banks 
in the sample. That is in order to account for the effect of ownership on banks operation and 
performance, and also to have better understanding on how Islamic banks categories 
(windows or full-fledge) affect the theoretical model predictions, we cluster the samples in 
to three sample sets. Sample1 includes all non-Islamic and Islamic banks and is used to 
estimate model (5.1) – (5.3). Sample2 excludes Islamic windows and only account for full-
fledged Islamic banks, and Sample3 excludes government and regional banks so that both 
non-Islamic and Islamic banks are privately-owned banks.
62
 We apply model (5.3), the most 
robust specification, on Sample2 and Sample3. 
                                                          
62 Sample3 is equivalent with Sample2 in Chapter 1. There, it is shown that this particular sample set provides 
more comparable banks across types in terms of ownership structure and assets size. 
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The theoretical framework from which testable predictions are derived makes 
assumptions about several factors. In particular, the assumption of zero net worth or equity 
is based on the condition that both types of bank exactly meet the maturity–match constraint 
(3.7), which is necessary for the banks’ zero-profit equilibrium condition. Violation of the 
maturity-match constraint requires positive banks’ equity to be held to support the zero-
profit condition or, in other words, to ensure that banks stay solvent when facing liquidity 
shocks. The data summary in Table 2.4.1 implies that, on average, Islamic windows hold 
higher capital-to-assets ratio, which might signal their higher liquidity-risks exposure. The 
framework also excludes currency or cash holding, since inside money or deposits are the 
only form of money available in the economy, which is further subjected to a reserve 
requirement. Another excluded factor is the interbank market, for the framework assumes 
that banks are homogenous. The framework also absent from any default risk, in which 
banks are able to fully observe the outcome of investments, and from size consideration 
since bank size is indeterminate in equilibrium.  
This set of simplifying assumptions demands that particular control variables be 
included in the estimation; otherwise, the regression may suffer from omitted variable bias. 
Thus, to overcome such possibilities, we make equity, cash holdings, interbank placements 
and liabilities, and total loss provisions control variables in ijtX  matrix.
63
 In addition, to 
capture the effect of bank size, we include the share of individual bank assets to total assets 
of the industry. Other explanatory variables in that particular matrix are included based on 
the theoretical framework specification in the previous section. 
 
2.5.2 Empirical Results 
Before detailing the estimations of each testable prediction, we briefly look at the 
general pattern of the dependent variables for both types of banks, Islamic and non-Islamic. 
In general, the dependent variables seem to follow a trend, as shown by Figures 2.5.1 to 
                                                          
63 In the form of ratio to total assets where rate of return on deposits, rate of return on loans and ratio of net-
borrowing from the central bank to total assets are the dependent variables; and in log values where log of loans 
is the dependent variable.  
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2.5.4, except for net-borrowing from the central bank which is further confirmed by unit-
root tests in Table A1 of Appendix 2.3, in which Rloans, Rdep and Lloans are only 
stationary in level if we include linear time trends. 
The average rate of return on loans of the two types of banks in Figure 2.5.1 shows 
that they seem to follow different trends, especially in the first half of the sample. In 
particular, the average rate of return on loans of all and privately-owned non-Islamic banks 
was decreasing since January 2009, while the one of  Islamic banks, especially Islamic full-
fledged banks, was still increasing up to around the end of 2010 after which it started to have 
the same decreasing trend as non-Islamic banks. It is apparent that Islamic banks’ rate of 
return on loans vary not as smooth as the rate of return of their non-Islamic counterparts, 
which is probably caused by the application of the profit and loss sharing contract in the 
Islamic banking financing service, in which the effective rate of return on loans is based on 
the predetermined sharing coefficient instead of a predetermined nominal return.  
In Figure 2.5.2 we can see that the weighted rate of return on deposits of non-Islamic 
and Islamic banks follow approximately the same pattern throughout the sample. Similar 
with the rate of return on loans, Islamic banks’ weighted rate of return on deposits vary less 
smoothly than those of non-Islamic banks. This condition may also results from the profit 
and loss sharing scheme that is mainly adopted by the Islamic banks.
64
 
The patterns of average Lloans in Figure 2.5.3 are more apparent in following a long-
term linear trend. As Islamic banks in Indonesia remain in their expansion phase, their 
business growth is expected to be faster than pre-existing non-Islamic banks. The pattern 
shows that when we consider sample with all Islamic banks, the linear trend seems steeper 
than non-Islamic banks but not when we only consider Islamic full-fledged banks. The 
empirical exercise would further investigate whether the effect of the policy rate is 
significant enough in governing the series of different long-term trends.  
                                                          
64 Nevertheless, Islamic banks may not perfectly adopt profit and loss sharing mechanism in paying their 
depositors (investment account holders) due to competitive issues (see Chapter 1 on banks profit stability). 
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             Figure 2.5.1 Group-average rate of return on loans (Rloans in %)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.5.2 Group-average weighted rate of return on deposits  
(Rdep in %)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.5.3 Log of total loans (Lloans) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.5.4 Group-average net-borrowing from the central bank  
(NCB in %) 
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As explained in section 2.2.1, most of banks have a positive balance in the central 
bank, in addition to the required reserve, which is entitled to a certain return tied to the 
policy rate. Figure 2.5.4 shows that on average, non-Islamic banks have more placements 
(fewer liabilities) in the central bank as a percentage value of their total assets in comparison 
to their Islamic counterparts. These values seem to exhibit more seasonality factor than a 
long-term trend. Thus, inclusion of group-specific trends is not expected to deliver 
significantly different results. 
 
2.5.2.1 Estimation of rate of return on loans 
Based on the theoretical framework, factors that determine the rate of return on loans 
are the policy rate, the reserve ratio and the loan-to-asset ratio. These factors are included in 
the estimation as explanatory variables. However, since the reserve ratio is relatively 
constant during period of observations, it is not included in the estimation, but the ratio of 
net-borrowing from the central bank to total assets, NCB, is included instead. In addition, 
several control variables are included to capture factors that are not considered in the 
theoretical framework. These additional control variables are equity, cash holding, net-
interbank position and total loss provisions, where all are in the form of ratios to total assets. 
Table 2.5.1(a) provides estimation results using the baseline model (5.1), model with time 
dummies as in (5.2), and model with time dummies and group-specific time trends as in 
(5.3) on Sample1. Table 2.5.1(b) provides estimation results of model (5.3) on Sample2 and 
Sample3. The rest of the empirical results of other variables follow the same format except 
for NCB. 
Columns (1) and (3) of Table 2.5.1(a) show that estimations of the baseline model, in 
Sample1 support Prediction1. In response to policy rate that is higher than 6.5%, non-
Islamic banks increase their rate of return on loans 123 bps higher than Islamic banks do, as 
shown in the first row of column (1). From estimation with the level of policy rate as the 
treatment in column (2), non-Islamic bank raise their rate of return on loans 79.6 bps higher 
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than Islamic banks in response to 100 bps increases in the policy rate. Adding time dummies 
does not change the significance of these differences. These results fall partly in line with 
those of Hutapea and Kasri (2010), though with a different point of analysis,  who finds that 
in the period of increasing market interest rate, Islamic banks could not adjust their lending 
rates as much as non-Islamic banks.
65
 Nevertheless, unlike what the framework predicts in 
(3.22), the interest pass-through is not complete in general.   
Further, specification (5.3) is estimated by allowing the two groups to follow different 
time trends. In this case, the identification of the effect of the policy rate comes from 
whether such policy changes lead to deviations from pre-existing group-specific trends. 
Estimation results for Sample1 in columns (5) to (8) of Table 2.5.1(a) show that once these 
group-specific trends are introduced, the significant differences disappear. However, unlike 
the results on Sample1, when we estimate the same specification on Sample2 and Sample3 
(both exclude Islamic windows) , the significant differences between responses of Rloans to 
policy rate in non-Islamic and Islamic banks are still apparent and supporting Prediction 1 
(Table 2.5.2 (b), first and second rows). These imply that Islamic windows considerably 
suppress the potential differences between non-Islamic and Islamic banks in Sample1. 
Possibly, their interdependent with the corresponding non-Islamic bank as their main office 
might weaken the theoretical potential differences by violating the complete separation 
assumption in the theoretical framework (Section 2.3). 
The pass-through of the policy rate on Rloans seems fairly negligible. For Sample1 
the estimated coefficient of the policy rate, Rhigh or R, in columns (5) and (6) of Table 
2.5.1(a) is insignificant. For Sample2 and Sample3, 100 bps increases in policy rate only 
account to 5.8 bps and 7.2 bps increase in non-Islamic banks’ Rloans, respectively. This 
finding and the considerably high excess liquidity of the banking industry are in line with 
Gigineishvili (2011), who considers cases in 70 countries, and suggests that excess banking 
liquidity impedes the interest rate pass-through on the retail lending rate. In addition, as 
shown by the estimation results of loans in the next sub-section, the demand for loans are 
                                                          
65 According to their study, once the selling price is agreed upon, according to Sharia rule Islamic banks’ lending 
rate could not be upwardly adjusted. 
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relatively inelastic, indicating the low degree of competition in the banking industry. The 
literature of interest rate pass-through generally confirms that competition strengthens the 
pass-through process (among others Cottarelli and Kourelis (1994), Sorensen and Werner 
(2006), Gigineishvili (2011) and Trinugroho et.al (2014) for the case of Indonesia). Our 
finding of weak pass-through and inelastic loans are in support of this line of literature. On 
the other hand, the pass-through on Islamic banks is unexpectedly negative at 10% level of 
significance where 100 bps increases in policy rate is associated with 116 bps and 105 bps 
decreases on Islamic banks’ Rloans in Sample2 and Sample3, respectively (Table 2.5.2(b) 
columns (2) and (6)).  This somewhat may have been driven by the profit and loss sharing 
contract in the Islamic banking financing service, in which the effective rate of return on 
loans is based on the predetermined sharing coefficient instead of a predetermined nominal 
return so that its correlations with policy rate is less straight forward. Nevertheless, further 
research is needed to explain this finding.     
For the effects of control variables, LAR and NCB as two variables from the 
theoretical framework, turns out to be insignificantly affects banks’ loans rate in all sample 
sets. For the control variables that are not included in the theoretical framework, the 
estimations show varying results across sample sets. In Sample1, banks with higher capital 
CAR tend to have lower loans rates at 10% level of significance, but insignificant in 
Sample2 and Sample3. In this case, it seems that the conventional risk-return hypothesis 
may have applied to banks with a lower capital ratio, hence more risk delivers higher returns 
in comparison to a better-capitalized bank. Nevertheless, the estimated effect is negligible, 
as 1 percentage of higher CAR is associated with only around 0.6 bps lower loans rate (Table 
2.5.1(a), fourth row). All results for Sample1 and some results for Sample3 show that banks 
which hold more cash, KAR, tend to have a higher loans rate in order to compensate for the 
foregone return of holding cash, but not for Sample2. On the other hand, the estimated 
coefficients of NIB in Sample2 and Sample3 are significantly positive, but not in Sample1. 
For the Market-share variable, as a representation of size and market power, the results show 
that it does not significantly correlate with the rate of return on loans in all sample sets.   
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Table 2.5.1(a) Estimation results of rate of return on loans (Rloans) for Sample1 
  Sample1 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Rhigh  Dummy NI 1.231*** 
- 
0.966*** 
- 
0.240 
- 
0.269 
- 
 
(0.381) (0.365) (0.276) (0.293) 
R  Dummy NI 
- 
0.796*** 
- 
0.696** 
- 
0.257 
- 
0.343 
 
(0.291) (0.319) (0.196) (0.219) 
LAR -0.004 -0.003 -0.001 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 
 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
CAR -0.005* -0.006* -0.006* -0.006* -0.006* -0.006* -0.006* -0.006* 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
KAR 0.183** 0.167** 0.138* 0.137* 0.132* 0.133* 0.129* 0.132* 
 
(0.080) (0.076) (0.077) (0.075) (0.072) (0.072) (0.073) (0.073) 
NIB 0.019 0.020 0.022 0.022 0.018 0.019 0.021 0.021 
 
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) 
LLP 0.050* 0.045* 0.029 0.025 0.035* 0.035* 0.022 0.022 
 
(0.026) (0.024) (0.025) (0.023) (0.021) (0.021) (0.022) (0.022) 
NCB 0.008 0.007 0.003 0.004 0.008 0.008 0.005 0.005 
 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Market Share 0.456 0.454 0.459 0.439 0.439 0.440 0.424 0.426 
 
(0.360) (0.366) (0.378) (0.374) (0.355) (0.355) (0.367) (0.369) 
Rhigh or R
a)
 -0.586* -0.347 
- - 
-0.245 -0.237 
- - 
 
(0.347) (0.276) (0.256) (0.175) 
Time effects No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Group time trends No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 8,354 8,354 8,354 8,354 8,354 8,354 8,354 8,354 
R-squared 0.043 0.066 0.126 0.135 0.082 0.082 0.137 0.138 
Notes: Within group estimation. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Coefficient that are significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
level are marked with ***, **, and * respectively. All estimations include a constant term and NI dummy. Rhigh is a dummy variable for policy rate > 
6.5% and R is the level of policy rate. LAR, CAR, KAR, NIB, LLP and NCB are ratio of loans, equity, cash, net-interbank placements, loss provisions 
and net-borrowing to the central bank to total assets, respectively. Market Share is share of individual assets to total assets of industry. a) Rhigh for 
columns (1) and (5), R for columns (2) and (6).  
75 
 
Table 2.5.1(b) Estimation results of rate of return on loans (Rloans) for Sample2 and Sample3 
  Sample2 Sample3 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Rhigh  Dummy NI 0.916* 
- 
0.915* 
- 
0.830 
- 
0.809 
- 
 
(0.498) (0.492) (0.511) (0.501) 
R  Dummy NI 
- 
1.217* 
- 
1.252** 
- 
1.124* 
- 
1.104* 
 
(0.626) (0.621) (0.591) (0.586) 
LAR -0.005 -0.006 0.008 0.007 -0.003 -0.005 0.014 0.013 
 
(0.021) (0.021) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.025) (0.025) 
CAR -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
KAR 0.142 0.144 0.095 0.094 0.544* 0.537* 0.486 0.479 
 
(0.130) (0.128) (0.129) (0.128) (0.308) (0.303) (0.306) (0.300) 
NIB 0.047** 0.047** 0.052** 0.052** 0.049* 0.049* 0.051* 0.051* 
 
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.028) (0.028) (0.027) (0.027) 
LLP 0.040* 0.041* 0.017 0.017 0.039* 0.039* 0.010 0.010 
 
(0.023) (0.023) (0.019) (0.018) (0.022) (0.022) (0.018) (0.018) 
NCB 0.002 0.002 -0.013 -0.012 0.006 0.006 -0.009 -0.009 
 
(0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (0.023) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) 
Market Share 0.436 0.432 0.441 0.435 1.541 1.530 1.615 1.600 
 
(0.368) (0.369) (0.384) (0.384) (1.177) (1.171) (1.198) (1.197) 
Rhigh or R
a)
 -0.885* -1.159* 
- - 
-0.767 -1.052* 
- - 
 
(0.481) (0.623) (0.477) (0.581) 
Time effects No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Group time trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 6,943 6,943 6,943 6,943 5,132 5,132 5,132 5,132 
R-squared 0.119 0.121 0.196 0.199 0.139 0.141 0.241 0.243 
Notes: Within group estimation. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Coefficient that are significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5% and 
10% level are marked with ***, **, and * respectively. All estimations include a constant term and NI dummy. Rhigh is a dummy variable for 
policy rate > 6.5% and R is the level of policy rate. LAR, CAR, KAR, NIB, LLP and NCB are ratio of loans, equity, cash, net-interbank 
placements, loss provisions and net-borrowing to the central bank to total assets, respectively. Market Share is share of individual assets to total 
assets of industry. Sample2 excludes Islamic-windows; Sample3 is Sample2 excluding government and regional banks. 
a) Rhigh for columns (1) and (5), R for columns (2) and (6).  
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2.5.2.2 Estimation of rate of return on deposits 
In section 2.3.3, the weighted average rate of return on deposits is determined by the 
returns that banks received from their different assets portfolio. These various returns are, in 
turn, satisfying the non-arbitrage condition that ensures an optimum borrowing from the 
central bank. According to this, the assets portfolio and its respective returns do affect the 
return that banks give on deposits but do not affect its response to changes in the central 
bank rate. Thus, the rate of return on loans and loan-to-asset ratio are included as 
explanatory variables, while the same with the previous estimation of rate of return on loans, 
NCB is included in place of the reserve requirement ratio, with ratio of equity, cash holdings, 
net-interbank position and loss provisions to total assets being included as control variables.  
Columns (1) and (2) in Table 2.5.2(a) show that Prediction 2 is empirically supported 
by the data in Sample1. The weighted returns on deposits, Rdep, of the two bank-groups 
vary positively with the policy rate, as shown in the treatment effect, where a policy rate 
higher than 6.5% on average is followed by 203 bps increase in the deposit rate (column 
(1)), or for every 100 bps of policy rate, banks’ retail deposit rate in increases by 120 bps 
(column (2)), indicating a complete interest rate pass through. As further confirmation of 
Prediction 2, there are no significant differences in their responses, as shown by the 
insignificant estimated coefficients on the first and second rows. Results in columns (3) and 
(4) with the time dummies confirm the baseline results. Similar results were also garnered by 
Hutapea and Kasri (2010) for the Indonesian case, and Cevik and Charap (2011) for the 
cases of Malaysia and Turkey. 
Columns (5) to (8) in Table 2.5.2(a) show that, as already apparent from Figure 2.4.2, 
inclusions of group-specific trends do not alter the no-difference results shown in the first 
two rows. These results are quite robust to different sub samples as in Table 2.5.2(b), except 
for column (8) in Sample3 where privately-owned non-Islamic banks increase their deposit 
rate more than their Islamic counterparts. However, these group-specific time trends do 
significantly cut the estimated pass-through, as shown by Table 2.5.2(a) from 120 % 
(column (2)) to around 60%  (column (8)), implying that the previous estimation is driven by 
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the group specific time-trend, lessening the pass-through. For the sub-samples in Table 
2.5.2(b), the pass-through is even lower at 47.3% for Sample2 (column (2)) and at 41.4% for 
Sample3 (column (6)). This finding of incomplete pass-through on deposits rate is predicted 
by the framework as in (3.24). It is also in parallel with studies in the literature such as 
Bondt (2002) for the Euro area and Wang and Lee (2009) for Asia, in which Indonesia took 
part, who find respectively 40% and 45% long-run pass-through.  
The loan-to-asset ratio, LAR, and the rate of return on loans, Rloans, positively affect 
the weighted rate of return on deposits as predicted by the theoretical framework. An extra 1 
percentage increases in share of loans to total assets is associated with an extra 15-16 bps on 
deposits rate in Sample1 (Table 2.5.2(a) column (5)-(8)), but the effect is not significant in 
Sample2 and Sample3 (Table 2.5.2(b)). While for Rloans, its significant positive effect on 
Rdep is robust to all sample sets at 1% level of significance. The baseline results in Sample1 
show that net-borrowing from the central bank, NCB, has a significantly positive correlation 
with Rdep, implying that banks actually share the gain from this net-borrowing activity with 
their depositors (Table 2.5.2(a) columns (1) and (3)). These results are even stronger and 
considerably more significant for Sample2 and Sample3 in Table 2.5.2(b).  
For the control variables from outside the theoretical framework, higher cash holdings 
are correlated with lower rate of return on deposits, in which an additional 1% of KAR 
corresponds to about 22 bps decreases in the deposits rate in Sample1 and Sample3, and 
around 14 bps decreases in Sample2. These results indicate that holding cash conveys a 
lower rate of return than other asset portfolios. The more a bank holds its assets in cash, the 
smaller the return to be paid to the depositor. Similar with estimation on rate of return on 
loans, the Market share variable also does not significantly affect the rate of return on 
deposits for all samples. However, the ratio of loss provisions to total assets, LLP, which 
reflects assets quality or default risks, is negatively significant in affecting deposits rate. 
Lower assets quality induces lower banks return and thus the return to be paid to the 
depositor. This effect is significant at 10% level in Sample1 (Table 2.5.2(a) columns (3), (4), 
(7) and (8), but not significant in Sample2 and Sample3, which may imply that the results 
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are mainly driven by the Islamic windows that are excluded from the other two sample sets. 
In the contrary, the estimated coefficients of CAR and NIB, which are insignificant in 
Sample1, are negatively significant in Sample2 and Sample3. Again, these show that the 
effect of control variables are varying across sample sets. 
Overall, the estimation results of rate of return on deposits are in support of 
Prediction2 for all sample sets, with a stronger interest rate pass-through in comparison to 
the one via rate of return on loans. As predicted by the theoretical framework, in general 
there is no significant difference in pass-through via non-Islamic and Islamic banks since 
transmissions on both types of banks are merely subject to satisfaction of the non-arbitrage 
condition. 
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Table 2.5.2(a) Estimation results of weighted rate of return on deposits (Rdep) for Sample1 
  Sample1 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Rhigh  Dummy NI -0.973 
- 
-0.757 
- 
-0.099 
- 
-0.127 
- 
 
(0.906) (0.842) (0.364) (0.362) 
R  Dummy NI 
- 
-0.617 
- 
-0.492 
- 
-0.035 
- 
0.048 
 
(0.534) (0.533) (0.291) (0.279) 
LAR 0.011* 0.013* 0.015** 0.015** 0.015** 0.015** 0.016** 0.016** 
 
(0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) 
CAR -0.003* -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
KAR -0.151*** -0.204*** -0.228*** -0.227*** -0.218*** -0.218*** -0.221*** -0.220*** 
 
(0.044) (0.051) (0.058) (0.057) (0.056) (0.056) (0.053) (0.053) 
NIB -0.004 -0.002 0.000 0.001 -0.003 -0.002 0.001 0.001 
 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
LLP -0.017 -0.016 -0.031* -0.029* -0.018 -0.014 -0.025* -0.024* 
 
(0.019) (0.017) (0.018) (0.017) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
NCB 0.014*** 0.009 0.010* 0.009 0.010 0.008 0.008 0.008 
 
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) 
Rloans 0.195*** 0.181*** 0.128*** 0.134*** 0.182*** 0.182*** 0.138*** 0.138*** 
 
(0.036) (0.029) (0.025) (0.027) (0.029) (0.028) (0.027) (0.027) 
Market Share -0.011 0.060 0.067 0.077 0.074 0.083 0.094 0.095 
 
(0.139) (0.132) (0.132) (0.139) (0.139) (0.143) (0.151) (0.151) 
Rhigh or R
a)
 2.035** 1.201** 
- - 
0.801** 0.593** 
- - 
 
(0.898) (0.532) (0.351) (0.286) 
Time effects No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Group time trends No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 8,260 8,260 8,260 8,260 8,260 8,260 8,260 8,260 
R-squared 0.152 0.192 0.232 0.235 0.195 0.199 0.240 0.240 
Notes: Within group estimation. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Coefficient that are significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
level are marked with ***, **, and * respectively. All estimations include a constant term and NI dummy. Rhigh is a dummy variable for policy rate > 
6.5% and R is the level of policy rate. LAR, CAR, KAR, NIB, LLP and NCB are ratio of loans, equity, cash, net-interbank placements, loss provisions 
and net-borrowing to the central bank to total assets, respectively. Market Share is share of individual assets to total assets of industry. Sample1 consists 
of all banks. a) Rhigh for columns (1) and (5), R for columns (2) and (6).  
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Table 2.5.2(b) Estimation results of weighted rate of return on deposits (Rdep) for Sample2 and Sample3 
  Sample2 Sample3 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Rhigh  Dummy NI 0.155 
- 
0.129 
- 
0.467 
- 
0.401 
- 
 
(0.308) (0.314) (0.297) (0.317) 
R  Dummy NI 
- 
0.076 
- 
0.229 
- 
0.390 
- 
0.554*** 
 
(0.261) (0.213) (0.241) (0.192) 
LAR -0.017 -0.013 -0.010 -0.010 -0.021 -0.018 -0.012 -0.013 
 
(0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
CAR -0.002** -0.003** -0.003*** -0.003** -0.002* -0.003** -0.003** -0.003** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
KAR -0.104* -0.106* -0.143** -0.143** -0.163* -0.224** -0.222** -0.225** 
 
(0.054) (0.055) (0.063) (0.063) (0.091) (0.090) (0.094) (0.093) 
NIB -0.024*** -0.021** -0.016** -0.016** -0.027*** -0.024** -0.019* -0.019* 
 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
LLP 0.002 0.004 -0.008 -0.008 0.002 0.006 -0.006 -0.006 
 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
NCB 0.036*** 0.030*** 0.028*** 0.028*** 0.036*** 0.026** 0.025** 0.025** 
 
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) 
Rloans 0.193*** 0.192*** 0.136*** 0.135*** 0.184*** 0.184*** 0.110*** 0.109*** 
 
(0.027) (0.026) (0.022) (0.022) (0.025) (0.024) (0.021) (0.022) 
Market Share -0.031 -0.013 -0.001 -0.002 -0.061 0.026 0.092 0.086 
 
(0.112) (0.117) (0.119) (0.119) (0.332) (0.308) (0.322) (0.319) 
Rhigh or R
a)
 0.571* 0.473* 
- - 
0.533* 0.414* 
- - 
 
(0.304) (0.254) (0.297) (0.234) 
Time effects No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Group time trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 6,880 6,880 6,880 6,880 5,072 5,072 5,072 5,072 
R-squared 0.318 0.326 0.416 0.416 0.409 0.430 0.554 0.555 
Notes: Within group estimation. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Coefficient that are significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5% 
and 10% level are marked with ***, **, and * respectively. All estimations include a constant term and NI dummy. Rhigh is a dummy variable 
for policy rate > 6.5% and R is the level of policy rate. LAR, CAR, KAR, NIB, LLP NCB are ratio of loans, equity, cash, net-interbank, loss 
provisions and net-borrowing to the central bank to total assets, respectively. Market Share is share of individual assets to total assets of 
industry. Sample2 excludes Islamic-windows; Sample3 is Sample2 excluding government banks. a) Rhigh for col.(1)&(5), R for col.(2)&(6).  
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2.5.2.3 Estimation of total loans 
In the theoretical framework, the main explanatory variable for loans is the rate of 
return on loans, Rloans, which might have a positive effect for the supply of loans, or 
negative effect for demand for loans. The other explanatory variable from the framework is 
the net-borrowing from the central bank, NCB, which is expected to positively affect 
business loans via the supply side. The banks equity and other banks assets that are not 
included in the theoretical framework serve as additional control variables in the estimation. 
All variables are in log values, except for NCB and Rloans which are in percentage value. 
The baseline estimation results in columns (1) to (4) of Table 2.5.3(a) show that 
Prediction3 is partially supported by the data in Sample1. In particular, the empirical test 
confirms that banks loans are decreasing following the treatment.  However in contrary to 
the framework prediction, the decreases are larger for Islamic banks. In column (1) 
following policy rate higher than 6.5%, total loans of non-Islamic and Islamic banks are 
decreasing by approximately 7.3% and 24.1%, respectively. A similar result in column (2), 
which shows that an increase in 100 bps in the policy rate corresponds to a decrease of 10% 
and 25% on loans of non-Islamic and Islamic banks, respectively. Arguably, the higher 
growth trend of Islamic banks when compared to non-Islamic banks may have contributed to 
these contrary results. Thus, the inclusion of group-specific time trends is even more crucial 
for this highly trended series. 
Columns (5) to (8) show that, the significant differences disappear once the group-
specific time trends are introduced, suggesting that non-Islamic banks and Islamic banks 
loans do not, in fact, respond differently to the policy rate. These results are generally 
supported by the results for Sample2 and Sample3 as in Table 2.5.3(b), except for the 
baseline estimation using Rhigh as the treatment, though it disappear in more robust 
estimations. Apparently, the significant differences from the previous results are driven by 
the pre-existing long-term trend of the series.   
The additional net-borrowing from the central banks is significantly increasing the 
supply of loans. However, the rate of return on loans does not significantly affect the volume 
82 
 
of loans in all sample sets, suggesting inelastic loan demand and supply functions. This 
insignificant effect partly explains why the significant differences in response of Rloans, as 
in Table 2.5.1(b) for Sample2 and Sample3, do not feed on to differences in response of 
loans in the same sample sets.  This finding is in accordance with Trinugroho et.al (2014) 
who studies Indonesian banks’ continuously high net interest margin since the financial 
crisis in 1997/1998. Further, this high net interest margin could be a sign that banks are 
facing a relatively inelastic demand for loans (Ho and Saunders, 1981). 
Log of equity, cash holding and interbank liabilities are positively correlated with log 
of loans, indicating that these control variables positively contribute to the evolution of 
supply of loans with a negative contribution from interbank placements, as expected. For 
Sample1, the highest effect comes from cash holding, of which 10% increases in cash 
holding are associated with up to around 30% increases in loans (Table 2.5.3(a), columns (5) 
– (8)), and the effect is slightly lower for Sample2 and Sample3. This indicates banks’ 
inclination to hold more liquid assets to anticipate their illiquid investment. On the other 
hand, unlike the previous results where market share does not significantly affect a bank’s 
rate of return on loans, it does play a significant role in explaining banks loans in all sample 
sets. For Sample1 and Sample2 a 1% increase in a bank’s market share of each type is 
associated with around 10-11% increases in loans, and the effect is even higher for Sample3 
which reaches around 30%. These significant results could be a sign of bank lending channel 
operating, where larger banks tend to face less hindrance for non-deposit funding to support 
their lending activities (Kashyap and Stein, 1995).
66
 It also could be an indication of higher 
loans diversifications that bolster loan growth of larger banks in comparison to smaller 
banks (Smirlock, 1985). Nevertheless, the inclusion of group-specific time trends generally 
removes the significant effect of the policy rate in all sample sets. Apparently, loans growth 
of non-Islamic and Islamic banks already exhibit long term trends despite of the evolution of 
the policy rate.  
                                                          
66 Though in this case we expect policy rate to significantly affect bank lending, which is not the case as we will 
see further after the inclusion of group-specific time trends. 
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Table 2.5.3(a) Estimation results of total loans (in log values) for Sample1 
  Sample1 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Rhigh  Dummy NI 0.168** 
- 
0.182** 
- 
0.022 
- 
0.021 
- 
 
(0.078) (0.073) (0.072) (0.073) 
R  Dummy NI 
- 
0.152*** 
- 
0.142*** 
- 
0.022 
- 
0.022 
 
(0.044) (0.046) (0.051) (0.055) 
Lequity 0.191*** 0.171*** 0.131*** 0.130*** 0.130*** 0.130*** 0.127*** 0.127*** 
 
(0.064) (0.057) (0.047) (0.046) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) 
Lcash 0.489*** 0.412*** 0.336*** 0.319*** 0.294*** 0.291*** 0.305*** 0.305*** 
 
(0.096) (0.092) (0.084) (0.084) (0.082) (0.082) (0.084) (0.084) 
Lintbanka -0.024 -0.038** -0.050*** -0.052*** -0.053*** -0.053*** -0.052*** -0.052*** 
 
(0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) 
Lintbankp 0.059*** 0.050*** 0.043*** 0.042*** 0.041*** 0.041*** 0.041*** 0.041*** 
 
(0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Lsecurities 0.008 0.009 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.011 0.011 
 
(0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
NCB 0.015*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.018*** 0.017*** 0.018*** 0.018*** 
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Rloans -0.016 -0.010 0.004 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003 
 
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Market Share 0.113* 0.114* 0.125* 0.125* 0.124* 0.124* 0.124* 0.124* 
 
(0.066) (0.061) (0.065) (0.068) (0.065) (0.067) (0.067) (0.067) 
Rhigh or R
a)
 -0.241*** -0.250*** 
- - 
0.061 0.031 
- - 
 
(0.078) (0.047) (0.068) (0.048) 
Time effects No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Group time trends No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 8,264 8,264 8,264 8,264 8,264 8,264 8,264 8,264 
R-squared 0.526 0.558 0.618 0.622 0.617 0.617 0.625 0.625 
Notes: Within group estimation. Clustered standard error in parentheses. Coefficient that are significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5% and 
10% level are marked with ***, **, and * respectively. All estimations include a constant. Market Share is share of individual assets to total assets 
of industry. Variable x in log values written as Lx, and NCB is ratio of net-borrowing to the central bank to total assets. Sample1 consists of all 
banks. a) Rhigh for columns (1) and (5), R for columns (2) and (6). 
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Table 2.5.3(b) Estimation results of total loans (in log values) for Sample2 and Sample3 
  Sample2 Sample3 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Rhigh  Dummy NI 0.126* 
- 
0.100 
- 
0.116* 
- 
0.092 
- 
 
(0.066) (0.068) (0.066) (0.069) 
R  Dummy NI 
- 
0.133 
- 
0.140 
- 
0.110 
- 
0.124 
 
(0.106) (0.113) (0.094) (0.104) 
Lequity 0.317*** 0.319*** 0.307*** 0.306*** 0.328*** 0.328*** 0.313*** 0.312*** 
 
(0.063) (0.064) (0.064) (0.064) (0.064) (0.064) (0.065) (0.065) 
Lcash 0.257** 0.254** 0.273** 0.272** 0.239** 0.236** 0.257** 0.256** 
 
(0.106) (0.106) (0.109) (0.109) (0.111) (0.111) (0.116) (0.115) 
Lintbanka -0.040*** -0.040*** -0.040*** -0.040*** -0.045** -0.045** -0.042** -0.042** 
 
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.020) (0.020) (0.019) (0.019) 
Lintbankp 0.040*** 0.040*** 0.041*** 0.041*** 0.049*** 0.049*** 0.049*** 0.049*** 
 
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
Lsecurities 0.009 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012 
 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
NCB 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.024*** 0.024*** 0.024*** 0.024*** 
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) 
Rloans -0.000 -0.001 0.004 0.004 -0.000 -0.001 0.005 0.005 
 
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) 
Market Share 0.110* 0.110* 0.110* 0.110* 0.321** 0.327** 0.316** 0.316** 
 
(0.056) (0.058) (0.058) (0.058) (0.147) (0.148) (0.141) (0.141) 
Rhigh or R
a)
 -0.047 -0.082 
- - 
-0.040 -0.072 
- - 
 
(0.060) (0.104) (0.057) (0.091) 
Time effects No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Group time trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 6,917 6,917 6,917 6,917 5,106 5,106 5,106 5,106 
R-squared 0.590 0.590 0.606 0.607 0.589 0.588 0.607 0.607 
Notes: Within group estimation. Clustered standard error in parentheses. Coefficient that are significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5% and 
10% level are marked with ***, **, and * respectively. All estimations include a constant. Market Share is share of individual assets to total assets 
of industry. Variable x in log values written as Lx, and NCB is ratio of net-borrowing to the central bank to total assets. Sample2 excludes Islamic-
windows; Sample3 is Sample2 excluding government banks. a) Rhigh for col.(1)&(5), R for col.(2)&(6). 
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2.5.2.4 Estimation of net-borrowing from the central bank 
Given the demand for business loans at the prevailing level of deposits, banks adjust 
their balances in the central bank to meet their demand for reserves taking into account the 
required reserves ratio. Since net-worth is assumed to be zero in the theoretical framework, 
NCB is taken as the amount of net-borrowed reserves to total assets instead of to total 
deposits. Thus, the explanatory variable that is used in the estimation on NCB is the loan-to-
asset ratio, LAR, in which the higher the ratio, the higher is the borrowed reserves. To ensure 
consistency, the control variables used in the estimation, i.e. equity, cash holding and net-
interbank placement, are also in percentage values of total assets.
67
 Table 2.5.4(a) provides 
estimation results using the baseline model (5.1), model with time dummies as in (5.2), and 
model with time dummies and group-specific time trends as in (5.3) on Sample1. Since the 
unit-root test shows that NCB does not exhibit a linear trend, Table 2.5.4(b) provides 
estimation results of model (5.1) and (5.2) on Sample2 and Sample3, without group-specific 
time trends. 
Table 2.5.4(a) shows that there is no significant response of the two bank-groups’ net-
borrowing from the central bank to the policy rate across observations in Sample1. As 
expected, inclusion of group-specific trends does not change the results. However, the 
results of Sample2 and Sample3 does show that non-Islamic banks cut their borrowing or 
increase their placements in the central bank following increases in the policy rate, while 
there is no significant response from Islamic banks. This implies that Islamic windows’ 
responses are similar with non-Islamic banks, so that the differences become apparent when 
they are excluded from the sample. Table 2.5.4(b) columns (4) and (8) show non-Islamic 
banks’ NCB decrease by 2.9% and by 2.2% for every 100 bps increases in the policy rate in 
Sample2 and Sample3, respectively. Since previous results show that non-Islamic banks do 
not significantly decrease their loans in response to policy rate increase, the significant 
decreases on their NCB indicate that there may be changes on the other banks’ assets 
portfolio beside loans to accommodate these decreases.   
                                                          
67 In addition, ratio of securities to total assets is also used as additional control variable. 
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The explanatory variable, LAR, is positively significant in affecting NCB, as expected 
by the theoretical framework. The estimated coefficient on LAR in Sample1 is smaller than 
in Sample2 and Sample3, but still considerably high where 100 bps increases in LAR is 
associated by around 57 bps increases in NCB for Sample1, and around 76 bps and 67 bps 
for Sample2 and Sample3, respectively. The other assets portfolio that is not included in the 
theoretical framework also show significant positive effect on NCB which indicates that 
other liquid assets partially substitute banks’ placement at the central bank. This partial 
substitution implies the risk-adjusted return of placement at the central bank is higher than 
any other liquid assets. The ratio of loans loss provisions, LLP, which reflects default risks, 
significantly affects NCB in which a 100 bps increases in the particular ratio induces around 
a 44 bps decreases in NCB in Sample1, while Sample2 and Sample3 show similar responses. 
However, while Rdep is insignificant in Sample2, it is positively significant in correlating 
with NCB in Sample2 and Sample3 at 1% level of significance. One of the possible 
explanations is that, as one of the alternatives for source of funds besides deposits, 
borrowing from the central bank increase when cost from deposit is higher. The rest of the 
independent variables, i.e. banks capital, market share, and banks prices on loans, appear to 
be insignificant. 
To sum up, the estimation results of return on NCB are somewhat in support of 
Prediction 4 for sub-samples that exclude Islamic windows. As predicted by the theoretical 
framework, non-Islamic banks NCB decrease more than Islamic banks. However, since the 
results from the response of loans show insignificant differences, the different response of 
NCB across bank types may be driven by various switching on other banks’ assets portfolio 
besides loans.  
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Table 2.5.4(a) Estimation results of net-borrowing from the central bank (NCB) in Sample1 
  Sample1 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Rhigh  Dummy NI -1.067 
- 
-0.826 
- 
-0.558 
- 
-0.579 
- 
 
(1.122) (1.139) (0.742) (0.737) 
R  Dummy NI 
- 
-0.321 
- 
-0.212 
- 
0.523 
- 
0.280 
 
(0.721) (0.831) (0.592) (0.572) 
LAR 0.570*** 0.572*** 0.565*** 0.566*** 0.572*** 0.572*** 0.565*** 0.566*** 
 
(0.054) (0.054) (0.055) (0.055) (0.054) (0.054) (0.055) (0.055) 
CAR -0.022 -0.023 -0.023 -0.023 -0.024 -0.024 -0.023 -0.023 
 
(0.021) (0.021) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) 
Cash+Netintbank+securities/ 0.617*** 0.618*** 0.610*** 0.611*** 0.614*** 0.618*** 0.610*** 0.611*** 
         Total assets (0.048) (0.049) (0.050) (0.050) (0.049) (0.049) (0.050) (0.050) 
LLP -0.437*** -0.439*** -0.435*** -0.434*** -0.439*** -0.432*** -0.433*** -0.430*** 
 
(0.055) (0.054) (0.056) (0.057) (0.055) (0.055) (0.057) (0.057) 
Rloans -0.044 -0.059 -0.069 -0.071 -0.049 -0.045 -0.065 -0.066 
 
(0.137) (0.140) (0.150) (0.148) (0.141) (0.141) (0.148) (0.149) 
Rdep 0.065 0.012 0.011 0.013 0.032 0.004 0.006 0.007 
 
(0.156) (0.151) (0.158) (0.158) (0.162) (0.154) (0.162) (0.160) 
Market Share 0.158 0.223 0.229 0.230 0.215 0.243 0.239 0.244 
 
(0.422) (0.393) (0.400) (0.400) (0.416) (0.402) (0.408) (0.406) 
Rhigh or R
a)
 1.014 0.634 
- - 
0.275 0.053 
- - 
 
(1.065) (0.711) (0.674) (0.537) 
Time effects No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Group time trends No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 8,263 8,263 8,263 8,263 8,263 8,263 8,263 8,263 
R-squared 0.537 0.538 0.545 0.545 0.538 0.539 0.546 0.545 
Notes: Within group estimation. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Coefficient that are significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
level are marked with ***, **, and * respectively. All estimations include a constant term and NI dummy. Rhigh is a dummy variable for policy rate > 
6.5% and R is the level of policy rate. LAR, CAR, KAR, and LLP are ratio of loans, equity, cash, net-interbank placements and loss provisions to total 
assets, respectively. Market Share is share of individual assets to total assets of industry. Sample1 consists of all banks. a) Rhigh for columns (1) and (5), 
R for columns (2) and (6).  
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Table 2.5.4(b) Estimation results of net-borrowing from the central bank (NCB) in Sample2 and Sample3 
  Sample2 Sample3 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Rhigh  Dummy NI -2.056 
- 
-2.565* 
- 
-1.291 
- 
-1.891 
- 
 
(1.384) (1.385) (1.239) (1.262) 
R  Dummy NI 
- 
-1.961 
- 
-2.925* 
- 
-1.354 
- 
-2.278* 
 
(1.325) (1.520) (1.120) (1.267) 
LAR 0.763*** 0.771*** 0.758*** 0.767*** 0.678*** 0.683*** 0.665*** 0.674*** 
 
(0.047) (0.045) (0.048) (0.044) (0.052) (0.050) (0.052) (0.049) 
CAR -0.007 -0.007 -0.006 -0.007 -0.011 -0.011 -0.011 -0.010 
 
(0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.018) (0.019) (0.020) (0.020) 
Cash+Netintbank+securities/ 0.646*** 0.650*** 0.637*** 0.640*** 0.565*** 0.567*** 0.550*** 0.554*** 
         Total assets (0.045) (0.043) (0.046) (0.044) (0.049) (0.047) (0.050) (0.049) 
LLP -0.482*** -0.487*** -0.485*** -0.488*** -0.430*** -0.433*** -0.422*** -0.424*** 
 
(0.039) (0.038) (0.042) (0.040) (0.046) (0.047) (0.051) (0.050) 
Rloans -0.238* -0.219 -0.276* -0.252* -0.224 -0.209 -0.250 -0.232 
 
(0.140) (0.146) (0.152) (0.152) (0.143) (0.155) (0.159) (0.158) 
Rdep 0.830*** 0.713*** 0.758*** 0.749*** 0.836*** 0.635*** 0.734*** 0.740*** 
 
(0.193) (0.201) (0.218) (0.208) (0.205) (0.239) (0.274) (0.262) 
Market Share 0.420 0.537 0.452 0.536 1.743 2.176 2.136 2.362 
 
(0.393) (0.408) (0.402) (0.420) (1.453) (1.491) (1.462) (1.513) 
Rhigh or R
a)
 1.366 1.940 
- - 
0.978 1.680 
- - 
 
(1.222) (1.277) (1.001) (1.043) 
Time effects No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Group time trends No No No No No No No No 
Observations 6,880 6,880 6,880 6,880 5,072 5,072 5,072 5,072 
R-squared 0.657 0.658 0.664 0.667 0.594 0.597 0.610 0.614 
Notes: Within group estimation. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Coefficient that are significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5% and 10% level are 
marked with ***, **, and * respectively. All estimations include a constant term and NI dummy. Rhigh is a dummy variable for policy rate > 6.5% and R is the 
level of policy rate. LAR, CAR, KAR, and LLP are ratio of loans, equity, cash, net-interbank placements and loss provisions to total assets, respectively. 
Market Share is share of individual assets to total assets of industry. Sample3 is Sample2 excluding government banks. a) Rhigh for columns (1) and (5), R for 
columns (2) and (6).  
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2.5.3 Discussion 
Generally, we find that the theoretical framework predictions are mostly supported by 
the empirical results except for the response of loans to monetary policy. These significant 
differences across responses of non-Islamic and Islamic banks are more apparent when we 
exclude Islamic windows from the sample sets. Therefore, we could infer that the responses 
of Islamic windows to monetary policy are not significantly different from the responses of 
non-Islamic banks. 
These no-difference results of Islamic windows may have originated by the failure of 
the type-for-type assumption, which requires each agent to only deals with agent of the same 
type. In the case of Islamic windows where the two types of banks are closely inter-
correlated to each other, there could be arbitrage opportunities across types which could 
impede the potential differences, since in this case it is very possible that they share their 
customer base. Though this does not exclude Islamic full-fledge banks from having the same 
association with non-Islamic customers, which may also cause failure of type-for-type 
assumption to some extent, yet the empirical results of this study implies that it is relatively 
limited than Islamic windows. Meanwhile, excluding government and regional banks from 
the sample set as an attempt to get more comparable banks on both types, do not deliver 
much change in the results, implying that the significant differences of Islamic full-fledge 
banks to non-Islamic banks are robust across sample sets. 
In accordance with the theoretical framework, the transmission goes from the policy 
rate to bank loans through demand for loans at the prevailing rate of return on loans. This 
channel seems to be relatively ineffective for an inelastic loans demand, as reflected by the 
statistically insignificant role of the loans rate in affecting the bank loans explained above. In 
addition to the possible violation of the type-for-type assumption, even if the particular 
assumption was not violated, different functions of demand for loans across firm types may 
also contribute to the no-difference results in the responses of loans to monetary policy. 
Arguably, Islamic banks’ borrowing may differ from non-Islamic banks’ borrowing due to 
religious motives, which may lead to different elasticity in the loans rate. Baele et al. (2014) 
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propound a similar idea, albeit from a different point of view, which finds that the default 
rate of Islamic loans is lower than conventional loans for the Pakistan case. 
Another aspect from the theoretical point of view is that the no-difference results 
across Islamic and non-Islamic banks in Sample1 could also come from the fact that Islamic 
windows might simply maintain a higher capital buffer to restore the maturity-match 
condition in (3.17).
68
 Indeed, the data demonstrates that, on average, the composition of time 
deposits to total deposits, TDD, which may reflect the ratio of patient to impatient 
households of the two bank groups, are fairly similar when Islamic windows are not 
excluded from the sample. In terms of the theoretical framework, it simply implies that
   NII   11 . Thus, the inclusion of capital as a control variable, fails to deliver any 
differences in the results when the framework is calibrated using the data of loan-to-asset 
ratio LAR. On the other hand, when we only consider Islamic full-fledge banks, the 
differences to non-Islamic banks are apparent since the data of LAR and TDD also show 
significant differences, and in support for the theoretical framework. This is also supported 
by the fact that Islamic full-fledged banks do not significantly maintain different capital 
buffer than non-Islamic banks. 
 
2.6 Conclusions 
This study tries to compare the effectiveness of monetary policy that works through 
central bank standing facilities in two types of banks, Islamic and non-Islamic banks. Based 
on the theoretical framework, different banks’ assets portfolios would lead to different 
responses to changes in the central bank’s policy rate. In particular, monetary transmission 
would be less effective on Islamic banks, which have limited portfolio choices and thus hold 
more loans, than their conventional counterparts.     
Initially, empirical works show that in general there is no-difference in responses of 
the two types of banks to the central bank policy rate, suggesting similar monetary 
transmission effectiveness. However, when we exclude Islamic windows from the sample, 
                                                          
68 Not taken into account any default risks since the theoretical model abstracts from it. 
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the potential difference that the theoretical framework predicts are apparent and statistically 
significant. The ultimate results show that monetary policy is transmitted more strongly via 
non-Islamic banks than via Islamic full-fledge banks, except for level of loans in which both 
types show similar responses. These changes demonstrate how the results are highly 
dependent on how well the two types of banks are segregated from each other.  The 
possibility that both types of banks are sharing their customer base generates arbitrage 
opportunities that drive prices toward equality across types, may cause similarity.  
As for the policy implications, the stricter is the separation between Islamic and non –
Islamic banks, the more apparent is the difference in effectiveness of monetary policy via 
both types of banks where non-Islamic banks potentially provide stronger channel. In 
general, the transmission works better in affecting deposit rates than through loans rates and 
bank’ loans. The inelastic demands for loans together with considerably high excess reserves 
dampen the monetary transmission on both types of banks through the particular channel of 
this study. 
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Appendix 2 
 
Appendix 2.1 Islamic Contracts69  
bay’ al-salam: Sale in which payment is made in advance by the buyer and the delivery of 
the goods is deferred by the seller. 
bay’ bithaman ajil: Sales contract where payment is made in instalments after delivery of 
goods. Sale could be for long term and there is no obligation to disclose profit margins. 
ijarah: Leasing contract which is the sale of usufruct of an asset. The lessor retains the 
ownership of the asset with all the rights and the responsibilities that go with the ownership. 
istisnah’: A contract whereby manufacturer (contractor) agree to produce (build) and deliver 
well-described products (or premises) at a given price on a given date in the future. The 
price need not be paid in advance and may be paid in instalments in step with the 
preferences of the parties, or partly at the front end and the balance later on, as agreed. 
ju’alah: Contract to perform a given task for a prescribed fee in a given period. 
mudarabah: Contract between two parties – a capital owner or financier and an investment 
manager. Profit is distributed between the two parties in accordance with the ratio upon 
which they agree at the time of the contract. Financial loss is borne only by the financier. 
The investment manager’s loss lies in not getting any reward for his services. 
murabahah: Sale at a specified profit margin. This term, however, is now used to refer to a 
sale agreement whereby the seller purchases the goods desired by the buyer and sells them at 
an agreed marked-up price, the payment being settled within an agreed time frame, either in 
instalments or as a lump sum. The seller bears the risk for the goods until they have been 
delivered to the buyer. 
musyarakah: Partnership. Similar to mudarabah contract, the difference being that here 
both partners participate in the management and the provision of capital and share in the 
profit and loss. Profits are distributed between the partners in accordance with the ratios 
initially set, whereas loss is distributed in proportion to each one’s share in the capital. 
wakalah: Contract of agency in which one person appoints someone else to perform a 
certain task on his behalf, usually for fixed fee.  
                                                          
69
 From: Askari, H., Z. Iqbal, N. Lrichene and A. Mirakhor (2010), The Stability of Islamic Finance: 
Creating a Resilient Financial Environment for a Secure Future. John Wiley & Sons (Asia), 
Singapore. 
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Appendix 2.2 The Government Budget Constraint 
 
Following the analysis in the framework, we consider an equilibrium in which households 
put all of their endowment as bank deposits. The market clearing condition for consumption 
goods market where government expenditures G  is assumed to do not affect households’ 
consumption bundle choice: 
   
i i
ii
G
ii
L
i
i
i i
ii
i
i
i
i BiKipyBKGpcpc 21   (A1) 
Substituting 
i
Li  and 
i
Gi  for CBi  the non-arbitrage condition in (3.13) with 
iiii HK )1(    and   iiii HB )1(1   as bank portfolio, we have the 
government budget constraint: 
   1 CB
i
ii iMHG        (A2) 
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Appendix 2.3 Unit-root and Cointegration tests 
 
Table A2.1 Im-Pesaran-Shin Unit-root tests (all banks) 
Variables 
without trend with trend 
Z-t-tilde-bar p-value Z-t-tilde-bar p-value 
Rloans 7.9239 1.000 -5.5595 0.000 
Rdep -0.0129 0.495 -10.0886 0.000 
Lloans 2.9515 0.998 -6.8068 0.000 
NCB -16.875 0.000 -22.7792 0.000 
 
Table A2.2 Cointegration tests (all banks) 
Dependent variables Independent  variables EC
1)
 
Lloans R -0.0902*** 
 
Lequity (0.0205) 
 
Lcash 
 
 
Lintbanka 
 
 
Lintbankp 
 
 
Lsecurities 
 
 
NCB 
 
 
Rloans 
   Market share   
Rloans R -0.0801*** 
 
LAR (0.0145) 
 
CAR 
 
 
KAR 
 
 
NIB 
 
 
LLP 
 
 
NCB 
   Market share   
Rdep R -0.204** 
 
LAR (0.0892) 
 
CAR 
 
 
KAR 
 
 
NIB 
 
 
LLP 
 
 
NCB 
 
 
Rloans 
   Market share   
Notes: Dynamic Fixed Effect regression. Clustered standard error 
in parentheses. Coefficient that are significantly different from 
zero at the 1%, 5% and 10% level are marked with ***, **, and *. 
1) Error correction terms 
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